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HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY 
STANDARDS INTO SMART REGULATION: ISO 140001 
AND ONTARIO’S ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES 
REGULATIONS 
 
Stepan Wood* & Lynn Johannson** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In June, 2007, the government of Ontario, Canada, released its long-
awaited Environmental Penalties (EP) regulations.1  EPs are an 
environmental version of speeding tickets: financial penalties that may be 
imposed by government inspectors upon discovery of an alleged 
environmental violation, without having to prove the elements of an 
offence through an expensive and time-consuming trial.  The regulations 
offer a small reduction in the amount of an EP if the violator had an 
environmental management system (EMS) in place that conformed to the 
ISO 14001 international EMS standard or the chemical industry’s 
                                                 
* Corresponding Author. Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York 
University, Toronto, Ontario and Vice-Chair, Canadian Standards Association Technical 
Committee on Environmental Management Systems (TC/EMS) and Standards Council of 
Canada Canadian Advisory Committee (CAC/SC 1) on the International Organization for 
Standardization Technical Committee 207, Subcommittee 1 (ISO TC 207/SC 1).  ISO TC 
207/SC 1 is the international committee responsible for developing and maintaining the 
ISO 14001 environmental management system standard. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the authors personally and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the Standards Council of Canada, the Canadian Standards Association, or the 
aforementioned committees. 
** President, E2 Management Corporation, Georgetown, Ontario and Chair, TC/EMS and 
CAC/SC 1. The same disclaimers apply as under Note 1.  
1 Environmental Penalties (Environmental Protection Act), O. Reg. 222/07; 
Environmental Penalties (Ontario Water Resources Act), O. Reg. 223/07.  See also 
Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Guideline for Implementing Environmental 
Penalties (Ontario Regulations 222/07 and 223/07) (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for 
Ontario, 2007). 
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Responsible Care program.  This article explores the implications of this 
attempt to incorporate voluntary EMS standards into regulation.  
 
An EMS is a set of management processes and procedures that allow an 
organization to identify, plan for, and manage the environmental aspects 
of its activities, products and services.2 Starting in the early 1990s, 
national and international standards development bodies began to develop 
EMS standards to offer comparability across organizations, sectors, and 
jurisdictions.  In 1996 the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), a federation of national standards bodies from around the world, 
published the first edition of the ISO 14001 international EMS standard.  
ISO 14001, which was revised in 2004, quickly emerged as the world’s 
pre-eminent EMS standard.  It has been adopted as a national standard by 
Canada3 and more than 140 other countries,4 and has been incorporated as 
the EMS component of the European Union’s voluntary Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme (EMAS).5  As of January, 2007, almost 130,000 ISO 
14001 certificates had been issued to private and public sector 
organizations in 142 countries.6 Countless more organizations have 
implemented ISO 14001 without seeking third party certification.   
                                                 
2 Environmental aspects are things an organization has or does that can result in adverse 
or beneficial impacts on the environment.  Environmental aspects include consumption of 
energy, water and materials, generation of noise, emission of pollutants, transportation of 
goods, and generation of waste.  Waste is often the first environmental aspect considered 
by an organization, because it is among the most visible and is often a sign of inefficient 
operation.  Where there is negative environmental impact, there is often lower 
productivity and lost profit.  It is this opportunity for cost savings and improved 
efficiency that drives many organizations to implement an EMS.  
3 CSA/ISO 14001:2004, Environmental management systems: requirements with 
guidance for use (Mississauga, Ontario: Canadian Standards Association, 2004). 
4 ISO, The ISO Survey of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Certificates, 2006 (Geneva: ISO, 
2007).  The figure is approximate because national member bodies have no obligation to 
report their adoption of ISO standards. 
5 Regulation (EC) No. 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
March 2001 allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-
management and audit scheme (EMAS), O.J. L 114 (April 24, 2001) 1-29.  See also 
European Commission, “EMAS – The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme,” online: 
ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm. 
6 Reinhard Peglau, “Worldwide ISO 14001 Update January 2007” (unpublished report, 
copy on file with authors). The number is approximate, because data are provided 
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ISO 14001 is based on a cyclical “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) process: 
An organization Plans to do something. It Does it. It Checks the results, 
and takes Action to correct problems, prevent recurrences and improve 
future results, all resulting in a process of continual improvement (See 
Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Plan, Do, Check, Act Model.   
Source: Lynn Johannson, Handbook on Green Productivity (Tokyo: Asian Productivity 
Organization, 2006). 
 
 
The presence of an EMS does not mean that an organization will never 
have another environmental problem. It does not mean that an 
organization will never cause a spill. However, a robust and credible EMS 
can enhance an organization’s efficiency, productivity, environmental 
performance and regulatory compliance by helping it to: 
 
• understand its environmental impacts,  
                                                                                                                         
voluntarily and there is no centralized system of reporting.  The number of firms with 
ISO 14001 certificates is probably much lower than the total number of certificates and 
possibly as low as 55,000-60,000, because large organizations typically obtain certificates 
at the individual facility level.  
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• identify cost-saving environmental improvement 
opportunities,  
• set and achieve environmental goals,  
• identify and comply with its legal and other obligations,  
• systematically control those aspects of its operations that 
cause environmental impacts,  
• monitor and measure its performance, take corrective and 
preventive action when needed,  
• assign environmental responsibilities and ensure personnel 
are competent to discharge them,  
• anticipate and respond to environmental emergencies, and  
• conduct regular and thorough reviews to find opportunities 
for improvement.7  
 
This article is not about the potential advantages or disadvantages of an 
EMS, however.  We can take it as a given that the Ontario government 
believes EMSs offer some benefits in terms of improved environmental or 
regulatory performance.  Otherwise why would it have proposed any 
penalty reduction for firms with EMSs?  The question for this article is, 
given the government’s acknowledgement of the potential benefits of 
EMSs, how should it have gone about incorporating them into its 
regulatory scheme?  
 
Ontario’s draft EP regulations were released for public comment in 
October, 2006 after several years of anticipation.8 Although the proposed 
                                                 
7 For empirical evidence of the impact of EMSs on environmental performance and 
regulatory compliance, see Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potosky, The Voluntary 
Environmentalists (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge, 2006). 
8 The government released two draft regulations. One was made under the Environmental 
Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. The other was made under the Ontario Water 
Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40.  The operative provisions of the two regulations 
were essentially the same.  For purposes of discussion, this article will refer to the EPA 
regulation.  The draft regulations were accompanied by a guidance document and various 
other supporting materials.  See Draft Ontario Regulation made under the Environmental 
Protection Act – Environmental Penalties (no date) [“Draft EP regulation”]; Draft Ontario 
Regulation made under the Ontario Water Resources Act – Environmental Penalties (no 
date); and Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Draft Guideline for Implementing 
Environmental Penalties (September 2006) [“Draft EP Guideline”]. All were posted for 
public comment on the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights Registry on October 6, 
2008] HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS 5 
 
 
 
penalty reduction for EMSs was a minor feature of the scheme and would 
apply in just one of ten Canadian provinces, it caused a stir in the global 
EMS standards community.  What alarmed the international EMS 
community was not that the government would offer a penalty reduction 
for EMS adoption.  This was generally welcomed.  It was how the 
government proposed to incorporate EMSs into the regulatory system that 
caused concern.   
 
ISO 14001 is a consensus-based standard that was developed and refined 
through a delicate, decade-long international negotiation process. It has 
been implemented by more than 100,000 organizations worldwide. Instead 
of integrating the globally-recognized ISO 14001 standard into its EP 
regulations, the government effectively wrote its own detailed EMS 
standard from scratch.  The government’s proposed EMS model was 
broadly similar to ISO 14001 and more or less compatible with leading 
sectoral standards such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
program.9 Yet it was full of idiosyncratic terminology, concepts and 
requirements that would make it very difficult for a regulated organization, 
auditor or government official to determine exactly how a “regulatory 
EMS” would differ from an ISO 14001 EMS, or exactly what more was 
needed to meet the requirements of the regulation. The result would have 
been uncertainty and added cost for regulated firms, with uncertain public 
policy benefits  
 
Moreover, at no point in the preparation of the draft EP regulations did the 
government consult with the established, multi-stakeholder national 
committee responsible for negotiating international EMS standards and 
adopting national EMS standards for Canada.  It was only after the draft 
regulations were released for public comment and the Canadian EMS 
standards committee requested a meeting that the government consulted 
relevant organs of the Canadian National Standards System.10   
                                                                                                                         
2006, EBR Registry No. RA06E0013, online: www.ebr.gov.on.ca, but were removed 
when the final versions were released (copies on file with the authors).   
9 The Responsible Care program was initiated by the Canadian chemical industry in 1985 
and is now a global initiative of the International Council of Chemical Associations.  See 
the Responsible Care website at www.responsiblecare.org.   
10 For a description of the Canadian National Standards System see Standards Council of 
Canada, “National Standards System”, online: http://www.scc.ca/en/nss/. 
  
6                                      CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 02 
 
 
In the end the Ontario government heeded the concerns of the EMS 
standards community. These concerns were focused on the problems 
caused by a parallel, “home-grown” EMS specification.11The Ministry 
incorporated most of the committee’s suggestions into the final EP 
regulations, which were released in June, 2007.12  The government deleted 
its “home-grown” EMS and simply referred to ISO 14001 and 
Responsible Care as the applicable standards.  This eliminated the risk of 
uncertainty and added cost for regulated firms. But it also represented a 
lost opportunity to engage in a serious public conversation about what ISO 
14001 can contribute to the achievement of public policy goals, what 
magnitude of regulatory incentive it should merit (for instance, is a 5% 
penalty reduction appropriate?), and what additional or different steps 
beyond conformity to ISO 14001, if any, should be expected from 
regulated entities in exchange for more favourable regulatory treatment.  
These questions have been raised in various jurisdictions around the world 
since the first publication of ISO 14001 in 1996, and are long overdue for 
serious and sustained public policy deliberation. 
 
As a result, Ontario’s EPs regulations and the process by which they were 
developed provide an object lesson in how not to approach the relationship 
between standards and government regulation.  The implications extend 
well beyond the subject of EPs and EMSs to embrace broader questions 
about: 
 
• what constitutes “smart” regulation,  
• what role standardization should play in smart regulation, 
and  
• what role standards and smart regulation should play in 
meeting the challenge of sustainable development.   
 
                                                 
11 The Canadian EMS committee did not express a view on other aspects of the draft 
regulation that were of concern to individual members.  Various companies, industry 
groups, EMS auditors and environmental non-governmental organizations expressed their 
views on these other issues separately. 
12 O. Reg. 222/07 & 223/07, above n. 1.   
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We cannot answer these questions adequately without recognizing the 
unique characteristics and challenges of small business.  Small business is 
the sleeping giant in the sustainability story, and it is about to awaken.  
Government environmental regulation, for all its successes, has proven 
inept at solving the environmental problems of and promoting 
environmental sustainability in small business.  Ontario’s EP regulations 
are but one example of this problem.  To be fair, the standardization 
community in general and ISO in particular have done no better at 
responding to the sustainability challenges of small business.  This article 
is a wake up call to both governments and standardization bodies to find 
new ways to engage with small business, and quickly. Unfolding 
environmental crises such as those associated with climate change, and 
impending demographic shifts associated with the aging of the Baby 
Boom generation, mean that Canada and other countries are about to enter 
a period of turmoil that will truly test their understanding of and ability to 
evolve toward sustainability.  
 
Using Ontario’s EP regulations as a cautionary tale, this article presents 
six tips for regulators on how to approach voluntary standards when 
developing regulations.13  The tips are presented from the perspective of 
two of the many people who have participated actively, on a volunteer 
basis, in the development of ISO standards and their adoption as national 
standards of Canada. The six tips are: 
 
1. Don’t re-invent the wheel. If recognized standards 
development bodies have gone to the trouble of developing 
a widely accepted, consensus-based standard that addresses 
the subject matter of a proposed regulation, incorporate the 
existing standard as far as possible and appropriate, instead 
of drafting a new specification from scratch; 
 
2. Strive for consistency. If a widely accepted standard 
already exists on the subject, don’t create a host of 
                                                 
13 While our tips are aimed specifically at the development of subordinate legislation 
(such as regulations in Canada and administrative rules in the United States), they apply 
generally to the development of public policy instruments by the executive or legislative 
branches of government, from statutes to regulations, rules, orders, licences, and 
guidelines. 
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unexplained inconsistencies between the proposed 
regulation and the standard; 
 
3. Make any extra requirements clear.  If an existing 
widely accepted standard does not, on its own, meet all the 
public policy goals of the proposed regulation, identify 
clearly how the standard is deficient and what more is 
required to meet public policy objectives; 
 
4. Connect with the experts. Consult relevant standards 
development committees when developing regulations; 
 
5. Get involved in voluntary standards development. 
Participate in the work of relevant standards development 
committees to keep abreast of relevant issues and influence 
the content of standards on an ongoing basis; and 
 
6. Consider the needs of small business. Design regulations 
in a way that addresses the special characteristics and 
challenges of the small-to-medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) that represent around 98%14 of the business 
community. 
 
Before we turn to these tips, a brief introduction to environmental 
penalties is in order.   
 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES 
 
Ontario borrowed the idea of environmental penalties from the United 
States, where similar tools have been available since the 1970s, usually 
under the name “administrative penalties” (APs).  APs take two basic 
forms.  Some, known as expedited AP orders or field citations, are issued 
on the spot by government enforcement personnel, like traffic tickets.  
                                                 
14 Industry Canada, “Key Small Business Statistics (KSBS)” (July 2007), online: 
www.strategis.gc.ca/sbstatistics. 
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These penalties impose small set fines for particular offences (usually in 
the hundreds of dollars) and are subject to limited appeals and procedural 
protections for violators.  The second form, known simply as 
administrative or civil penalties, are not issued on the spot but assessed in 
an environmental agency office on the basis of inspection reports and 
other information.  They are determined in accordance with often 
complex, discretionary penalty assessment procedures based on a range of 
factors including: 
 
• the gravity of the violation,  
• the violator’s state of mind,  
• the violator’s compliance history, and  
• the monetary or other benefits reaped by the violator as a 
result of the violation.   
 
They are typically much larger than on-the-spot fines (ranging from 
thousands to tens of thousands of dollars) and involve considerably more 
procedural steps and safeguards.   
 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES 
 
Administrative penalties were introduced to allow government officials to 
issue relatively modest financial penalties for relatively minor 
environmental violations. This avoided the expense of a full-blown 
prosecution.  Previously in the US (and to a large extent still in other 
jurisdictions including Canada), environmental law enforcement boiled 
down more or less to a binary choice between voluntary industry 
compliance and the blunt instrument of criminal or quasi-criminal 
prosecution, with the latter reserved only for the most egregious cases.15  
Investigations and prosecutions would often drag out for years before 
reaching a final conclusion. As a result, many violations were not 
investigated or prosecuted at all.16 
 
                                                 
15 E.g. David Boyd, Unnatural Law (Vancouver: UBC, 2003). 
16 Dianne Saxe, “Environmental penalty discount for ISO 14001:2004 users” ISO 
Management Systems (March-April 2007) 38.  
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Several innovative enforcement tools, including APs, civil enforcement 
actions, citizen suits and creative sentencing, were introduced to get away 
from this often unsatisfactory binary choice.  What sets APs apart is that 
they do away with the need for formal court proceedings altogether.  In 
theory this may reduce enforcement costs for governments, regulated 
firms and interested third parties alike, and increase the level of 
enforcement of environmental laws.17  For these reasons many 
governments have embraced APs enthusiastically.   
 
Regulated industries, on the other hand, have generally recoiled from 
them. They object to the spectre of absolute liability, the relative lack of 
judicial scrutiny, the high level of administrative discretion over some 
APs, and the one-size-fits-all approach of others.  Some environmental 
non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have embraced APs, but others 
have condemned them as trivializing what should properly be considered 
crimes.18  
 
These concerns notwithstanding, APs have proliferated in the US and have 
since been introduced in several other countries.  They are available under 
all major US federal environmental statutes and in many states.  They are 
one of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s favourite enforcement 
tools and their use has increased dramatically in the last few years.  The 
US EPA issued over 4,600 final APs in fiscal year 2006 with a total value 
of US $42 million.19    
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Carolyn Abbot, “Environmental Command Regulation,” in Benjamin J. Richardson 
and Stepan Wood, eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 61 at 
94. 
18 Ibid. at 93. 
19 US Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results: 
FY 2006 Numbers at a Glance (November 15, 2006), online: 
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2006/fy2006numbers.pdf 
(accessed 21 May 2007).  These were the highest totals ever by far.  Previously the 
number had fluctuated between around 1000 and 2000 final APs per year.  US 
Environmental Protection Agency, “National Enforcement Trends – FY 2005,” online: 
www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/nets.html (accessed 21 May 2007).  
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES IN ONTARIO 
 
Administrative penalties were first introduced in Ontario legislation in 
1998.  Faced with industry opposition, the government did not finalize the 
implementing regulations and the legislation was never brought into force.  
After a change of government and some high profile spills from 
petrochemical facilities, a new provincial statute known as the “Spills 
Bill” was enacted in 2005.20  Among other things, it reintroduced 
administrative penalties under the name “environmental penalties” (EPs).  
The government’s message to polluters was simple: “You spill, you 
pay.”21 The stated purpose of the Spills Bill was to ensure that polluters 
face immediate consequences for their actions.  EPs would be assessed by 
Ministry of the Environment (MOE) officials within a few days of a spill. 
In theory, this “would encourage companies to make greater efforts to 
prevent spills” and provide “additional incentives to clean them up 
quickly”.22  
 
The Spills Bill amended the province’s two flagship pollution statutes, the 
Environmental Protection Act23 and Ontario Water Resources Act,24 to 
authorize the imposition of EPs on “regulated persons”.  The purpose of 
EPs was to protect the environment by encouraging companies to take 
steps, including implementation of an environmental management system 
(EMS), to prevent environmental violations, remedy their effects and 
prevent their recurrence.   
 
The EPs provisions were to come into force only after implementing 
regulations were finalized.  The provincial government engaged in a year-
long process of public and stakeholder consultations on the EP regulations, 
                                                 
20 Environmental Enforcement Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 12 (Bill 
133). 
21 Government of Ontario, News Release, “McGuinty Government Introduces 
Environmental Penalties Legislation” (27 October 2004), 
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/2004/102702.htm (accessed 21 May 2007). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Above n. 8. 
24 Ibid. 
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starting in September, 2005 and culminating with the posting of the 
proposed regulations and a detailed guidance document for a 98-day 
public comment period in October, 2006.25 
 
Under the draft regulations, only around 150 large facilities in nine 
industry sectors26 that discharge contaminated effluent to a surface water 
course or private effluent treatment plant would be subject to EPs.  At 
first, EPs would only be available for violations involving unlawful 
discharges to water or land, with other violations such as permitting, 
operating, sampling, reporting and record keeping contraventions to be 
phased in after 18 months. 
 
The draft regulations specified the procedures for initiating, calculating, 
reviewing, settling, issuing, appealing and paying EPs.  They set the 
maximum amount of EPs at $100,000 per violation, per day, and specified 
factors for determining the amount of an EP.  EPs were not on-the-spot 
fines, but were to be issued by the MOE only after notice to the violator.  
The violator would have an opportunity to submit information and request 
a review of the proposed EP.  The amount of an EP would be determined 
by an MOE Director based on the gravity of the violation and any 
monetary benefit acquired by the violator as a result of the violation.  The 
amount could be reduced for a good compliance history, preventive 
measures, prompt remedial action, membership in a provincial 
environmental leadership program, or if the violator agreed to invest in a 
“beyond compliance” project that delivered environmental or human 
health benefits.  
 
In addition, the “gravity component” of an EP would be reduced by 5% 
for violators who could demonstrate that they had an EMS in place at the 
time of the violation that met the detailed requirements set out in Schedule 
1 of the regulations.27  The EMS would have to have been audited by an 
                                                 
25 Ontario Ministry of the Environment, “Consultation Process: Environmental Penalties” 
(slide presentation, November, 2006; copy on file with authors). 
26 Electric power generation, industrial minerals, inorganic chemicals, iron and steel 
manufacturing, metal casting, metal mining, organic chemical manufacturing, petroleum 
and pulp and paper.  Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, s. 2(1) and Table 1. 
27 Ibid., s. 17 and Schedule 1. 
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independent, external auditor and the violator would have to submit a 
statement from the auditor certifying that the EMS satisfied the 
requirements of the regulations. In effect, this called for a compliance 
audit, not an audit of an EMS, let alone an ISO 14001 audit. Industry and 
auditors objected that the cost of the required audit would exceed the 
benefit of the 5% reduction. 
 
Aside from this 5% reduction, procedures implemented or actions taken as 
part of an EMS (for example, environmental policies and procedures, risk 
analysis, preventive maintenance, containment structures, monitoring 
systems, operational controls, employee training, and emergency 
preparedness and response systems) could also be taken into account when 
determining what actions the violator took to prevent or mitigate the 
violation, further reducing the gravity component of the EP.  
 
The size of the penalty reduction for an EMS might seem so modest as not 
to merit any serious attention.  Why all the fuss about such a minor 
incentive?  On one level this is a fair point.  The amount of the penalty 
reduction is insufficient to provide any genuine incentive for regulated 
facilities to implement an EMS in line with the regulations.  Furthermore, 
the penalty reduction was relatively small potatoes in the public debate 
about the EPs scheme.  It was dwarfed by industry concerns about double 
jeopardy and absolute liability.   
 
On another level, however, the EMS penalty reduction raises issues that 
far exceed its modest size. 
 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES AND SMART REGULATION 
 
The introduction of APs or EPs is widely seen as part of a move toward 
“smarter” or more “responsive” regulation.  “Smart regulation” is 
presented by its proponents as an alternative to both the inherently limited 
“command and control” model of first-generation environmental 
regulation and the perceived excesses of neo-conservative deregulation.28  
                                                 
28 E.g. Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1998); Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
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The “command and control” model of environmental regulation was first 
introduced to respond to the plethora of environmental problems brought 
on by industrial pollution.29  This model of regulation was highly 
intrusive, prescriptive and inflexible, typically prohibiting any polluting 
activity without a permit. It commanded in detail when and to what extent 
industry should clean up, often to the point of prescribing the precise 
technologies to be used. It controlled the observance of these prescriptions 
through monitoring, inspection and criminal or quasi-criminal 
enforcement.  It is widely credited with having achieved substantial 
improvements of a variety of “first generation” environmental problems.  
But by the early 1980s it had come under increasing criticism for being too 
cumbersome, costly, rigid and slow in producing further improvements.  
There were warnings that it was nearing the limits of its technical 
capacity30 or liable to “break down under its own weight.”31  These 
critiques had early political victories in the neo-conservative programs of 
deregulation and fiscal restraint of the Reagan-Thatcher years.  By the 
mid-1990s, however, inspired by the Rio Earth Summit and an 
unprecedented wave of public environmental awareness, many 
governments and regulation scholars began to take more nuanced 
approaches to the problem, seeking to reinvent environmental regulation 
in ways that built on its early successes and at the same time recognized its 
limitations and the changing nature of environmental problems.   
 
One of the principal limitations of traditional environmental regulation is 
that it was and remains aimed overwhelmingly at large, stationary, point-
source polluters – that is, big companies and government facilities (for 
                                                                                                                         
the Deregulation-Reregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1992); Cass Sunstein, 
“Paradoxes of the Regulatory State” (1990) 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407. 
29 For overviews of the command model of environmental regulation and its critics, see 
Lynn Johannson, “Tuning into Station WIIFY on ISO 14000: What’s in it for you” Total 
Quality Environmental Management (Winter 1995/96) __; Ben Richardson and Stepan 
Wood, “Environmental Law for Sustainability,” in Ben Richardson and Stepan Wood, 
eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 1, 3-13; Carolyn Abbot, 
“Command Environmental Regulation,” in ibid., 61. 
30 Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair, above n. 28. 
31 Eric W. Orts, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 
1227, 1241. 
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example, sewage works and power plants). By contrast, many of the most 
pressing contemporary environmental challenges – habitat destruction, 
biodiversity loss, climate change and persistent toxic substances, to name 
some of the most prominent – are of a different, potentially more 
intractable, character because they are the cumulative results of the 
everyday choices and actions of countless people and organizations that 
control innumerable geographically dispersed, often mobile, non-point 
sources of pollution.  To address these problems, we must mobilize and 
influence a much broader range of actors, including individuals, 
households and – crucially, as we will argue toward the end of the article – 
small business.   
 
The paradigmatic tools of command regulation have limited capacity to 
respond to these contemporary challenges and to regulate these kinds of 
actors effectively.  A traditional command-regulation approach to these 
problems and actors would entail a prohibitively costly, technically 
impractical and politically unacceptable level of government intrusion into 
the minutiae of everyday life.  It is questionable whether such an approach 
would yield a net gain for the environment 
 
We use “smart regulation” as an umbrella term for efforts to take a more 
nuanced and sophisticated approach to environmental and other problems. 
It aims to make more effective and efficient use of public resources. It 
employs a greater variety of regulatory instruments, from taxes and 
emissions trading to corporate environmental disclosure and public 
participation rights. It seeks to stimulate self-reflection and self-correction 
by regulated actors in line with public goals, rather than dictating the 
details of permissible behaviour.  Such an approach “attempts to create 
incentives and procedures that induce entities to act in certain ways and to 
engage in internal reflection about what form that behaviour should 
take…the state sets goals, but shares more of the responsibility for 
achieving them with regulated entities.”32  
 
                                                 
32 D.J. Fiorino, “Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and 
Governance” (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441, 448. 
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Smart regulation has been embraced, in various forms, by governments 
and intergovernmental organizations throughout the developed world.33  In 
Canada, its most recent manifestation was the previous federal 
government’s Smart Regulation initiative, launched in 2005 and led by the 
Treasury Board.  The stated goal of the Smart Regulation initiative was to 
create better, not less, regulation.34  The initiative was continued under a 
different name, but with substantially the same emphasis, by the current 
federal government elected in January, 2006.35  It involves a restructuring 
of the process of assessing, reforming and improving the regime in which 
regulations are developed, managed, enforced and measured.  It calls for: 
 
• increased scrutiny of the costs and benefits of new and existing 
regulations;  
• increased cooperation and harmonization among federal, 
provincial, and territorial governments, including more consistent 
environmental assessment procedures;  
• quicker approval processes for drugs, medical devices, and 
pesticides; increased international regulatory cooperation, 
including, most importantly, greater harmonization of regulatory 
standards and product approvals with the United States;  
• greater understanding and support for the needs of large industry; 
and  
                                                 
33 Much of the impetus for this spread came from the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) and its multi-year Regulatory Reform agenda. E.g. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Regulatory Policies in 
OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 2002); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Trade and Regulatory Reform: Insights from Country Experience (Paris: 
OECD, 2001). 
34 The word “smart” was an acronym for “Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, 
and Timely,” although the government did not necessarily commit to achieve these 
specific objectives. Reg Alcock, President of the Treasury Board of Canada, 
“Government of Canada’s Implementation Plan for Smart Regulation,” speech delivered 
to National Press Club (Ottawa, 24 March 2005), online: www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/ps-
dp/2005/0324_e.asp?printable=True. 
35 The current Conservative government calls it “performance-based regulation” and 
dropped the adjective “smart,” presumably to distance itself from the previous Liberal 
government.  See Government of Canada, “Regulation” web site, online: 
www.regulation.gc.ca.  
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• less burdensome regulation of small business.36   
 
The Smart Regulation initiative has been criticized by leading Canadian 
environmental groups, who argue that it:  
 
• is a deregulatory agenda in disguise, 
• prioritizes business over public health, safety, and the 
environment, 
• neglects the need to apply and enforce existing environmental 
regulations,  
• ignores evidence that command regulation can be more effective 
than voluntary or non-regulatory approaches, and 
• ignores evidence that international harmonization tends to exert 
downward pressure on environmental, health, and safety standards 
and to hamper transparency, accountability, timeliness and 
effectiveness of regulation.37   
 
Whatever the merits of these objections, they are a useful reminder that 
smart regulation is not just about greater flexibility, competitiveness and 
lower regulatory costs for regulated businesses. It must balance these 
attributes with the imperative to protect public health, safety, welfare, and 
environmental integrity and promote environmentally and socially 
sustainable economic development.  It is also a reminder that strong and 
effective laws and regulations can and should maintain a prominent place 
in a sophisticated mix of policy instruments.   
 
Smart regulation, in theory, means using the best tool for the problem at 
hand, employing the best technique for every situation. Among other 
                                                 
36 External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Smart Regulation: A Regulatory 
Strategy for Canada (Ottawa: External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, 2004). 
37 Canadian Environmental Law Association, Letter to Prime Minister Paul Martin (22 
October 2004), online: www.cela.ca (accessed March 12, 2005); Canadian Environmental 
Law Association (CELA) et al., Letter to Chair and members of the External Advisory 
Committee on Smart Regulation (16 August 2004), online: www.cela.ca (accessed  
March 12, 2005); and West Coast Environmental Law Association, West Coast 
Environmental Law’s Comments on ‘Smart Regulation for Canada,’ Submission to 
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation (August 2004), online: www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/smartreg-regint/en/06/01/index.html (visited 12 March 2005). 
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things, the federal government directive on Smart Regulation challenges 
government decision-makers to “make use of all or parts of relevant 
national or international standards, guidelines, and recommendations as a 
basis for technical regulations and for conformity assessment procedures 
when they fulfill intended policy objectives.”38 This brings us to the 
central question of this article: what role can voluntary non-governmental 
standards play in smart regulation and in moving society on the path 
toward sustainability?  We answer this question in the form of six tips for 
regulators. 
 
III. SIX TIPS FOR INTEGRATING STANDARDS INTO 
SMART REGULATION  
 
In the remainder of the article we present six tips for how to integrate non-
governmental consensus standards into government regulation.  In each 
case, we use the example of the draft Ontario EP regulations as an object 
lesson. 
 
Tip 1. Don’t re-invent the wheel. If recognized standards development 
bodies have gone to the trouble of developing a widely accepted, 
consensus-based standard that addresses the subject matter of a 
proposed regulation, incorporate the existing standard as far as 
possible and appropriate, instead of drafting a new specification 
from scratch. 
 
When the government of Ontario decided to develop regulations offering a 
penalty reduction to violators with an EMS in place, it had a choice.  It 
could adopt ISO 14001 or another existing standard as a benchmark 
against which their management systems would be judged. Or, it could 
develop its own EMS requirements from scratch.  ISO 14001 is the 
product of many thousands of hours of deliberation by hundreds of experts 
over more than a decade. It was drafted by experts from industry, 
                                                 
38 Government of Canada, Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (Ottawa: 
Government of Canada, 2007) 6, online: www.regulation.gc.ca. This directive replaced 
the previous Liberal government’s Cabinet directive on smart regulation, which contained 
an identical provision. 
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environmental consulting firms, standards development organizations, 
government, consumer groups and – to a lesser extent – environmental 
groups and research institutions, representing dozens of countries and 
international organizations.  These experts, working mostly as volunteers, 
developed ISO 14001 over an initial five year period and saw it through a 
further five-year revision process that culminated with the publication of 
the second edition in 2004.  Most of them participated through their 
national ISO member bodies. Some participated through the numerous 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations that have 
liaison status with ISO.  The process involved a significant investment of 
resources. It work followed the consensus-based standards development 
model of ISO and its member bodies.  In this model, in theory at least, all 
major interests, from big and small business to auditors, governments, 
consumers, public interest groups and scientists, are represented 
effectively. In theory, the resulting standards reflect a consensus of all 
these interests.  While this ideal may not be realized perfectly in practice,39 
ISO 14001 represents the closest approximation we have to a global 
consensus on what an environmental management system should look 
like. 
 
Instead of reaping the fruits of this collective experience and expertise, the 
government of Ontario expended substantial time and energy drafting its 
own detailed description of the requirements an EMS must meet to qualify 
for the reduction.  These requirements did not refer to ISO 14001 or any 
other standard such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
program.40  Instead it set out detailed requirements for: 
 
□ an environmental policy, 
□ identification of environmental aspects and legal 
requirements,  
□ environmental objectives and targets,  
□ roles and responsibilities,  
□ resources,  
                                                 
39 Some environmental NGOs, for example, withdrew from or refused to participate in 
the development of ISO 14001 in the mid-1990s because of perceived industry 
domination.  
40 Draft EP regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1. 
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□ operational control,  
□ monitoring,  
□ emergency preparedness and response,  
□ corrective and preventive action,  
□ training and competence,  
□ documentation,  
□ audits and management review. 
 
These are all typical elements of an EMS.  
 
The government may have had cogent reasons for promulgating its own 
purpose-built EMS standard.  For one thing, it commissioned research 
which revealed that many companies’ EMSs were custom-made or based 
on a particular industry code such as Responsible Care.  The government 
wished, quite reasonably, to accommodate the diversity of approaches to 
EMSs.  Another reason may have been the government’s concern that an 
ISO 14001-based EMS, on its own, would not respond adequately to 
public policy objectives such as improved spill prevention, corrective 
action, legal compliance, and corporate transparency.   
 
A. ADVANTAGES OF INCORPORATING STANDARDS INTO 
REGULATION 
 
Given this line of reasoning, why should regulatory authorities incorporate 
existing non-governmental standards into regulatory instruments?  Why, 
for example, should the Ontario government adopt ISO 14001 as the 
baseline for eligibility for an EP reduction?  The Standards Council of 
Canada (SCC) answers this question as follows: 
 
Some advantages for a regulatory authority referencing standards 
developed within the National Standards System include: 
 
(a)  the standards have been developed by balanced committees 
of all relevant interests, employing the principles of 
consensus; 
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(b)  the standards have undergone a public review process as well 
as a “second level review” by the SDO [standards 
development organization] prior to publication; 
(c)  the standards are maintained and reviewed at appropriate 
intervals to ensure current technological developments are 
incorporated; 
(d)  the commercial needs of producers, users, and other interests 
are addressed at the development stage, thus ensuing 
regulations referencing these standards are more amenable to 
commercial acceptance; and, 
(e)  the standards address the national public interest by 
considering to the extent possible as appropriate to the 
subject of the standard, how it advances the national 
economy, supports sustainable development, benefits the 
health, safety and welfare of workers and the public, assists 
and protects consumers and facilitates trade.41 
B. WHAT ARE STANDARDS? 
 
What, then, are standards and what is the Standards Council of Canada?  
For purposes of this article, a standard is a “document, established by 
consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common 
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or 
results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a 
given context.”42  Standards may relate to nomenclature, measurement, 
design, function, performance, safety, consistency, ingredients or any 
number of other attributes of materials, products or the processes by which 
they are produced.  They may relate to inter-operability or compatibility of 
different products.  They may also, as in the case of EMS standards, relate 
                                                 
41 Standards Council of Canada, Key Considerations in the Development and Use of 
Standards in Legislative Instruments (Ottawa: Standards Council of Canada, 2006) 3, 
online:  http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/brochures/index.shtml. 
42 Standards Council of Canada, CAN-P-1E, Accreditation of Standards Development 
Organizations (Ottawa: SCC, 2006) s. 2.2 (“CAN-P-1E”), online: 
http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/criteria/all.shtml, quoting ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, 
Standardization and Related Activities – General Vocabulary (Geneva: ISO/IEC, 2004) s. 
3.2 (“ISO/IEC Guide 2”). 
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to a generic management framework and associated processes employed 
by organizations.   
 
Standardization is as old as human history.43 The case for standardization 
is simple.  Clear, verifiable standards facilitate trade by encouraging 
consistency and interchangeability of products and parts from different 
places. They protect customers by discouraging fraud.  They can enhance 
the reliability and safety of goods and services.  In theory, they can 
facilitate the transfer of technology from advanced to developing and 
transitional economies and promote transnational cooperation on 
economic and scientific matters. For proponents of standardization, the 
value of standards in enhancing productivity and prosperity cannot be 
understated.44  According to critics, however, standards may inhibit 
innovation by fixing technologies or practices in time.  They may also 
operate as barriers to market entry, a complaint often raised by developing 
country producers who see standards as non-tariff trade barriers.  Despite 
these potential objections, standards are widely seen by governments and 
business as enhancing social welfare and economic prosperity.45  
 
Virtually no aspect of our daily lives is untouched by standards.  Many 
people are unaware how deeply their lives are affected by standardization.  
Standards govern everything from screw thread sizes and bicycle helmet 
design to internet protocols and high definition television formats.  In 
Canada alone there are several thousand national standards “for everything 
from AC circuits to zirconium”.46  At the international level there are 
many thousands more.  ISO has published almost 16,500 international 
                                                 
43 John Perry, The Story of Standards (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1955). 
44 Danielle Goldfarb, If We Can Fix It Here, We Can Make It Anywhere: Effective 
Policies at Home to Boost Canada’s Global Success (Ottawa: Conference Board of 
Canada, 2007). 
45 E.g. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the Links 
between Trade, Standards and the WTO (Geneva: WTO, 2006) at 29, 41. 
46 Standards Council of Canada, “National Standards System”, online: 
http://www.scc.ca/en/nss/. 
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standards.47 You can thank international standards for the fact that a bank 
card issued by a Canadian bank works in a bank machine in Brazil, or that 
you can fix a lawnmower made in the United States with a bolt made in 
China.  For all their pervasiveness, however, standards and the bodies that 
develop them keep a remarkably low profile. You may have heard of ISO 
photographic film speed ratings (if you are old enough to remember film 
cameras, that is).  You may have seen the Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 
logo on consumer products.  You may even have been momentarily 
curious when passing a highway billboard declaring a facility to be 
registered to ISO 9001 or ISO 14001.48  But this is the extent of most 
people’s knowledge of standards.   
 
Standards, as defined in this article, have two key characteristics that 
distinguish them from legislative instruments such as statutes and 
regulations.  First, they are approved by a recognized body, which means a 
body recognized by the relevant national or international body responsible 
for accrediting standards development organizations.  Second, they are 
established by consensus, which carries two conditions: first, that 
representatives of all interest categories participate in their development; 
and second, that there is no sustained opposition from any significant 
segment of interested parties at any critical stage in the development of a 
standard.   
 
C. APPROVED BY A RECOGNIZED BODY 
 
Although there may occasionally be a question whether a particular body 
is or should be a “recognized body,” the central players are 
uncontroversial.  ISO sits at the pinnacle of the standardization world and 
is recognized, alongside a handful of other international standards 
                                                 
47 International Organization for Standardization, ISO In Figures for the Year 2006 
(Geneva: ISO, 2007), online: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isoinfigures/January2007-p1.html.  
48 Registration is only one option for demonstrating conformity to these two voluntary 
standards.  We discuss the other options below.   
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bodies,49 as a leading source of technical standards.  ISO has been 
recognized as such by the World Trade Organization’s Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) Committee and numerous United Nations organs. There is 
no controversy that it is a “recognized body” for purposes of our 
definition.  It is a network of 158 national member bodies, one member 
per country, coordinated by a Central Secretariat in Switzerland.50   
 
ISO occupies a peculiar niche, perched between the public and private 
sectors. It acts as a bridging organization, striving for consensus on 
standards that meet both the needs of society, as articulated by 
governments, and the requirements of business. ISO membership is open 
to the one body in each country that is the most representative of 
standardization in its country.  Many ISO member bodies, especially in 
developing and transitional countries, are government agencies or quasi-
public bodies with their mandates set out by legislation. Other ISO 
member bodies in some industrialized countries have their roots in the 
private sector, representing national partnerships of industry associations.   
 
Canada’s ISO member body is the Standards Council of Canada, a federal 
crown corporation created by statute in 1970. Its mandate is to foster and 
promote voluntary standardization in Canada. Although it reports to 
Parliament and is financed partially by Parliamentary appropriation, it is 
independent of government in its policies and operations. The SCC is 
governed by a Governing Council of 15 members appointed to represent 
federal, provincial and territorial governments, accredited Canadian 
standards development organizations (SDOs) and the private sector.   
 
The SCC oversees Canada’s National Standards System (NSS) and 
coordinates Canadian input to foreign and international standardization 
forums, including ISO.  The NSS is a network of more than 400 
organizations and more than fifteen thousand individuals involved in 
standards development, promotion and implementation in Canada.  The 
SCC does not develop standards itself.  It has accredited four SDOs to 
                                                 
49 Chief among which are the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC), the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(Codex).   
50 ISO In Figures for the Year 2006, supra note 47. 
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develop National Standards of Canada.  The Canadian Standards 
Association (CSA) is one of these. 51  We will focus on CSA since it is 
responsible for developing Canadian EMS standards.  CSA is an 
independent, not-for-profit membership-based association serving 
business, industry, government and consumers.  Its primary mandate is to 
develop standards that work for people and business.52   
When CSA or another accredited SDO develops a standard, it submits it to 
SCC for approval as a National Standard of Canada.  Similarly, when an 
international standards body such as ISO develops a standard with 
Canadian participation or potential application in Canada, the standard 
may be submitted to SCC by the relevant Canadian SDO for approval as a 
National Standard of Canada.  A standard may be designated as a National 
Standard of Canada if it meets the following criteria: 
 
• it was developed by a committee that had balanced 
representation of all stakeholders including consumer and 
public interests and followed a consensus process,  
• the standard was subjected to public review,  
• it is published in both official languages, 
• it is consistent with existing international standards and  
• it does not constitute an illegitimate barrier to trade.53 
  
D. DEVELOPED BY CONSENSUS 
 
The principle of consensus is the core of the standards community’s claim 
to credibility. It is the key reason regulators should refer to standards when 
developing regulatory instruments.  SCC adopts ISO’s definition of 
consensus as “general agreement, characterized by the absence of 
sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the 
                                                 
51 The others are the Bureau de Normalisation du Québec (BNQ), Canadian General 
Standards Board (CGSB), and Underwriters Laboratories of Canada (ULC). 
52 See CSA home page, http://www.csa.ca. 
53 Standards Council of Canada, CAN-P-2F, Requirements and Procedures for the 
Request for, Development, Approval, Preparation, and Maintenance of National 
Standards of Canada (Ottawa: SCC, 2006) (“CAN-P-2F”), online: 
http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/criteria/all.shtml. 
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concerned interests and by a process seeking to take into account the 
views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting 
arguments.”54  Elaborating upon this basic definition, SCC’s rules – which 
are contained in basic documents known as “CAN-Ps” – require that the 
consensus process be governed by the following principles:  
 
a) Equal access and effective participation by concerned interests 
(this entails sufficient resources, equal access to information, and 
understanding of the process by all parties). In order to ensure 
effective participation, resources (money, training, staff expertise, 
etc.) shall be identified for member participation; 
b) Respect for diverse interests and identification of those who 
should be provided access … to provide the needed balance of 
interests; 
c) Mechanism for dispute resolution….55 
 
SCC recognizes the “particular challenges in finding the resources to 
permit participation by Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), academics, 
and consumers.”56 
 
SCC and CSA host or support the work of thousands of volunteers from 
all segments of Canadian society who serve on hundreds of different 
standards development committees.  The principle of consensus is 
manifested in both the structure of these committees and their decision-
making processes. SCC and CSA rules require that the membership of 
standards development committees reflect a "balanced matrix" of 
interested and affected parties. This is to ensure that the committee can 
capitalize on the combined strengths and expertise of all interest groups 
and no single category of interest can dominate the process.57  The SCC 
and CSA recognize four basic interest categories:  
 
                                                 
54 CAN-P-1E, above note 42, s. 2.1, quoting ISO/IEC Guide 2, above note  42, s. 1.7. 
55 CAN-P-1E, ibid., s. 1.1. 
56 Ibid. 
57 CAN-P-2F, above note 53, s. 3.1.5. 
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• Producers (those predominantly involved in production of 
products, materials or services, which usually means business 
firms);  
• Users (those who predominantly represent end users of the 
subject products, materials or services, including consumers);  
• Regulators (government bodies involved in regulating the 
subject products, materials or services); and  
• General interest (those with a demonstrated interest who do not 
fall into the other categories, such as academics, scientists and 
public interest NGOs).58   
 
Other interest categories may be identified that are relevant to particular 
committees’ work.  In the area of environmental management, for 
example, “service/professional” is recognized as a separate interest 
category to reflect the role of professional consultants, auditors and 
registrars59 in this area.  
 
Each CSA standards development committee must have a membership 
matrix that is approved by a strategic steering committee responsible for 
overseeing its work.60  The matrix defines interest categories appropriate 
to the committee’s scope and stipulates the minimum and maximum 
numbers of voting members for each interest category.  The actual number 
of voting members in any one category may not exceed the sum of the 
actual number of voting members in the two smallest interest categories.  
This requirement must be maintained as individual members change. 
Further, it must be met whenever any letter ballot or recorded vote is 
taken.  If the committee is out of balance, a vote will not be taken until 
balance is restored.  Once a draft standard has been agreed upon in 
committee, it is submitted for public review and amended if necessary to 
reflect the comments received.  Finally, standards are living documents, 
revised and refreshed to address changing requirements and emerging 
                                                 
58 Ibid.; Canadian Standards Association, CSA Directives and Guidelines Governing 
Standardization, Part 1: Participants and Organizational Structure (Rexdale, ON: CSA, 
1999) s. 3.3.3 (“CSA Directives”).   
59 It should be noted that registrars do not vote in Canadian standards development 
committees, as this might represent a conflict of interest. 
60 CSA Directives, above n. 58, s. 3.3. 
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technologies.  Each standard is reviewed every five years in a process of 
continual improvement. If the review concludes that a revision is required, 
this triggers a process of negotiations to improve the standard. 
 
The principles of balanced representation and consensus decision-making 
are, not surprisingly, realized imperfectly in practice.  The CSA has been 
criticized for inadequate participation by consumer groups, public interest 
NGOs and SMEs.61  There are various obstacles to effective participation 
by these interest categories, not the least of which are competing priorities 
and lack of awareness, resources, time, or technical capacity.  This makes 
it difficult to maintain a balanced matrix in some cases.  In other cases, 
there may be more difficulty attracting adequate participation from 
government or industry.  In any event the principle of equal and effective 
participation by all interest categories is taken seriously by both CSA and 
SCC. Furthermore, it is not clear that typical governmental policy-making 
processes do a substantially better job than CSA or SCC at ensuring 
balanced and effective participation by all interested and affected parties.  
As a result, the Canadian “balanced matrix” approach to national standards 
development is frequently held up as an example for other ISO member 
bodies to follow.   
 
E. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARDS 
 
ISO 14001 is a management system standard. Unlike traditional technical 
standards that address the characteristics, performance or design of 
specific products, management system standards address the broader 
management structures and processes employed in organizations.  They 
are “generic” in that they are not specific to any particular product, 
material, process, or industry sector but may be applied by any 
organization of any size or type, regardless of location and regardless of 
whether it is in the private or public sector.   
 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, CSA Environmental 
Standards Writing: Barriers to Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
Involvement (Toronto: CIELAP, 1997); Pollution Probe, Environmental Non-
Governmental Organization (ENGO) Participation in National Standards Setting 
(Toronto: Pollution Probe, 2002). 
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Management system standards were first developed in the field of quality 
management.  The best known are the ISO 9000 family of quality 
management standards.  More than 900,000 certifications exist in 170 
countries and economies to the ISO 9001 quality management system 
standard.62  As with ISO 14001, this number does not reflect the number 
of firms with ISO 9001 certificates, because one company may hold more 
than one certificate. The exact number of companies involved is not 
known. The management system approach has spread to other fields such 
as food safety, corporate social responsibility, information security and 
occupational health and safety.  
 
It also spread, famously, to environmental management. There are more 
than twenty standards in the ISO 14000 family. With the exception of ISO 
14001, they are all guidance standards, developed to help the user better 
understand the opportunities available regarding various aspects of 
environmental management.  At the heart of this family is ISO 14001, the 
standard on environmental management systems. It is the only standard in 
the family that sets out “specifications” – that is, auditable requirements.  
ISO 14001 outlines requirements that standards developers from around 
the world have agreed are important to “enable an organization to develop 
and implement a policy and objectives which take into account legal 
requirements and information about significant environmental aspects.”63  
 
ISO 14001, like other generic management standards, is designed to help 
any organization improve how it manages the environmental impacts of its 
activities, products or services.  The organization may be a for-profit 
private sector enterprise, a not-for profit organization or a public sector 
entity. ISO 14001, like ISO 9001, is a voluntary standard.  Organizations 
may adopt it in part or in whole.  Only organizations that adopt all its 
requirements may claim conformity to the standard, but many 
organizations may realize benefits from implementing only certain parts of 
it.  An organization may, for instance, already have a management system 
of its own design in place and wish to improve just one or a few elements.  
Furthermore, ISO 14001 is a “what” document. It outlines the 
requirements of a well-functioning EMS, but it does not dictate how these 
                                                 
62 ISO Survey, above n. 4.   
63 ISO 14001: 2004, above n. 3, Introduction.  
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requirements are to be fulfilled. The how is the responsibility of the 
adopting organization. This allows ISO 14001 to accommodate the 
diversity of organizations, cultures, and economic regions.  
 
Considering this diversity, it is amazing that agreement on an international 
EMS standard was achieved at all. Recall that standards are developed via 
a consensus process, so there has to be substantial agreement without 
sustained opposition from any significant portion of the interested parties 
at the table for a standard to be voted and accepted as an ISO document.  
Consensus has to be achieved not just at the international level but also in 
each ISO member body, where national negotiating positions are worked 
out and decisions ultimately made whether to adopt an ISO standard 
nationally.   
 
ISO 14001 was developed by an ISO committee known as ISO/TC 207/SC 
1.  Canadian experts played important roles in the negotiation of the 
original standard and its recent revision.  Throughout this process, 
Canada’s position in the international negotiations was developed by a 
national “mirror committee,” the Standards Council of Canada’s Canadian 
Advisory Committee on ISO/TC 207/SC 1 (the “CAC/SC 1” for short).  
This mirror committee is harmonized with (i.e., identical to) the CSA 
technical committee responsible for developing national EMS standards, 
the CSA Technical Committee on EMS (the “TC/EMS” for short).64  As 
such, the committee members wear two hats. When deliberating Canadian 
positions in the international standards development process, they act as 
the CAC/SC 1.  When considering whether to adopt a final ISO standard 
as a National Standard of Canada or other issues affecting domestic EMS 
standardization, they act as the TC/EMS.  Either way, the committee is 
bound by the balanced matrix and consensus requirements described 
above. This multi-stakeholder Canadian EMS standards committee 
deliberated at great length the merits of ISO 14001 for use in Canada. 
 
The existence of ISO 14001 is a testament to a global recognition of the 
challenge of sound environmental management and the benefits of a 
                                                 
64 CSA environmental committee names and structures were changed in 2007, but the 
basic model of a combined national and international “mirror” committee on EMS was 
maintained.  The combined TC/EMS—CAC/SC 1 is now a subcommittee of a larger 
CSA Technical Committee on Environmental Management and Related Activities.   
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common framework upon which common elements can be addressed in a 
way that enables comparison across different organizational, social and 
economic contexts. A key advantage of voluntary management system 
standards is that they enable an “apples to apples” comparison, while 
accommodating regional variability and the unique characteristics of 
individual organizational cultures.  Just as there are over 10,000 different 
varieties of apples, there is massive variety among private, public and 
voluntary sector organizations. The flexibility of ISO 14001 is important 
as there are over 150 million legally constituted enterprises in the world. 
Over 95% of these are SMEs.65  When properly integrated, the 
management system for each one would reflect something of its unique 
business culture, even though there would be similarities within a sector or 
business type. That is both the beauty and the bane of EMS standards. 
 
F. INCORPORATING EMS STANDARDS INTO SMART REGULATION 
 
When drafting its EPs regulations, the Ontario government could have 
incorporated ISO 14001 as a baseline for the EMS component of the 
regulations.  It did not.  ISO 14001 was not even mentioned in the draft 
regulations.  Instead the government drafted its own ad hoc, six-page66 
EMS standard more or less from scratch, along with a fifty-page guidance 
document which included a table listing some differences between its 
regulatory EMS and ISO 14001.  With the stroke of a pen, more than a 
decade of complex international negotiations, delicate compromises and 
multi-stakeholder national deliberations over ISO 14001 were set aside, at 
least for purposes of the EPs regime.   
 
This was not an example of Smart Regulation, for several reasons.  First, 
by attempting, in effect, to write a whole new EMS standard, the 
government passed up an opportunity to save some public policy 
development costs by taking advantage of the substantial expertise, time 
                                                 
65 We estimated this figure by extrapolation from data compiled by the International 
Finance Corporation.  International Finance Corporation, Micro, Small and Medium 
Enterprises: A Collection of Published Data (Washington: IFC, 2006).  
66 For comparison, this is approximately the same length as the requirements clause of 
ISO 14001.  ISO 14001:2004, above note 3, clause 4. 
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and money that went into the development of the existing ISO 14001 
standard.  This would have been an effective way to move a portion of the 
cost of policy development off the public budget and enlist non-
governmental resources in the development of public policy instruments.67   
 
Second, even more important than saving governmental resources, one of 
the central goals of smart regulation is to enlist the self-critical, reflexive 
capacities of regulated actors so that they govern themselves in line with 
democratically established public policy goals.  EMSs are quintessentially 
a reflexive tool.68  If designed properly and implemented in a robust and 
credible manner, they stimulate organizations to reflect upon and 
systematically manage their environmental aspects and impacts. This 
fosters a cyclical process of target-setting, implementation, self-evaluation 
and high level management review that prompts continual improvement of 
both their management systems and their environmental performance.  
EMSs allow organizations to internalize environmental issues, including 
environmental legal requirements, into all decision-making, from high 
level strategy to daily operations.  
 
Third, and crucially, regulations encouraging voluntary EMS adoption 
preserve a high level of autonomy for regulated entities.  We live in 
liberal-democratic capitalist societies, in which individual autonomy and 
private enterprise are fundamental values.  Autonomy in an enterprise is a 
valued condition; that is one reason it is called “private” enterprise.  
Business owners wish to maintain their autonomy so that they are able to 
respond quickly, efficiently and profitably to market needs.  
Encouragement of autonomy also makes sense from a regulator’s 
perspective, within certain limits.  Although there are exceptions, the most 
effective forms of regulation are often those that induce regulated entities 
to exercise their autonomy in a direction that achieves regulators’ public 
policy goals, rather than intervening in the minutiae of regulated firms’ 
operations.  This might be considered the Holy Grail of contemporary 
regulation in liberal-capitalist societies: to design a regulatory regime that 
effectively enlists the autonomous self-regulatory capacities of regulated 
                                                 
67 See Peter N. Grabosky, “Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory 
Compliance” (1995) 8 Governance 527. 
68 Orts, supra note 31. 
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actors in the service of democratically determined public policy goals.69  
Simply put, the more an organization does on its own and the more 
efficiently and effectively it operates, the less burden there is on law 
enforcement and the public purse. This is true whether it is a private or 
public sector organization.  Governments that promote policies 
encouraging the adoption of EMSs can expect to benefit from more 
independent action that may conceivably place many organizations ahead 
of regulatory requirements, provided the EMSs are sufficiently robust.  
Regulations that encourage the adoption of credible and robust EMSs can, 
therefore, exploit the autonomous, reflexive capacities of regulated 
organizations in the service of collective goals.   
 
Incorporating an existing National Standard of Canada into the EP 
regulations rather than rewriting it from scratch would also have had other 
advantages, including: 
 
• Presenting a regulatory solution that was likely to meet the 
expectations of a majority of the stakeholders addressed by the 
regulation, since the standard was developed by a consensus of 
various interests; 
• Embodying the knowledge and experience of a wider range of 
experts than the government might normally have at its disposal; 
• Enhancing uniformity of requirements faced by regulated entities, 
thereby reducing regulated entities’ costs and eliminating barriers 
to movement of goods and services; 
• Enhancing the likelihood of voluntary, market-driven compliance 
with regulations, thereby reducing the burden of regulatory 
oversight; and 
• Enhancing social efficiency, insofar as regulated entities use the 
same tool to meet both market and regulatory needs.70  
 
                                                 
69 E.g. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government” (1992) 43 British. J. Sociology 173, 184; Grabosky, above note 67; 
Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, above n. 28, 10, 123-125; Nikolas Rose, Powers of 
Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 1999) 50. 
70 Standards Council of Canada, above note 41, 6. 
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In light of these advantages it is not surprising that governments 
incorporate non-governmental technical standards into regulation very 
frequently and have done so as long as anyone can remember, especially 
in the fields of health, safety and consumer protection.71  Hundreds of 
voluntary standards have been incorporated by reference into current 
Canadian federal, provincial and municipal laws.72  The same is true in 
many other jurisdictions, including the European Community.73   
There are many ways to incorporate non-governmental standards into 
government regulation.  For example: 
 
• conformity with a voluntary standard might be made 
mandatory for particular organizations, products, materials, 
equipment, or processes,  
• it might be made a default basis for issuing a government 
approval, 
• it might be a consideration or requirement for government 
procurement contracts, 
• it might be the basis for eligibility for subsidies, reduced 
penalties or relief from otherwise applicable regulatory 
requirements (as in the case of the Ontario EP regulations)  
• Regulators or courts might be authorized to order violators 
to implement a voluntary standard,  
• a voluntary standard might be identified as “good practice” 
for regulatory purposes,  
• nonconformity with a voluntary standard might trigger 
documentation, reporting or remediation duties,  
• use of a voluntary standard might be authorized for testing, 
inspecting or measuring a regulated entity’s operations, 
equipment, or products, or  
                                                 
71 E.g. Robert W. Hamilton, “The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the 
Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health” (1978) 56 
Texas L. Rev. 1329. 
72 Saxe, above note 16. 
73 E.g. EMAS Regulation, above note 5. 
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• a voluntary standard’s definition of a term might be 
adopted as the regulatory definition.74   
 
Standards can be incorporated in whole or in part, and with or without 
qualifications.75  
 
Standards are usually incorporated into regulation by reference – that is, 
the standard is referred to rather than reproduced in the regulation.  
Occasionally, governments reproduce standards or parts of standards 
verbatim in regulations.  This is true of the EMAS regulation, which 
reproduces Clause 4 of ISO 14001 verbatim (with ISO’s permission) as 
the EMS component of the scheme.  The main disadvantage of this 
approach is the danger that inconsistency will develop between the 
regulation and the standard over time. Standards are typically revised from 
time to time, necessitating amendment of the corresponding regulation and 
posing the risk of inconsistency if there is a lag between publication of the 
revised standard and amendment of the regulation.76  Incorporation by 
reference, by contrast, allows regulators to accommodate subsequent 
changes to a standard without the necessity of further regulation. This 
allows regulation to respond easily and quickly to technical changes.  The 
trade-off is reduced control over the content of regulation, which may be 
undesirable from the regulator’s perspective.  In some cases it may even 
constitute an impermissible delegation of authority.77  As a result 
                                                 
74 For a taxonomy of ways in which voluntary standards might be incorporated into 
official legal systems, see Stepan Wood, “Environmental Management Systems and 
Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance,” (2002-03) 10 
Buffalo Envtl. L.J. 129; Stepan Wood, “Green Revolution or Greenwash?  Voluntary 
Environmental Standards, Public Law and Private Authority in Canada,” in Law 
Commission of Canada (ed.) New Perspectives on the Public-Private Divide (Vancouver: 
UBC, 2003) 123; Errol Meidinger, “Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. 
Environmental Law: Closer than You May Think” (2001) 31 Envtl L. Rptr. 10162. 
75 See, e.g., Standards Council of Canada, above note 41, 8-9 (discussing options for 
incorporating standards into regulation). 
76 Indeed, the EMAS regulation had to be amended after ISO 14001:2004 was published, 
to incorporate the changes to the standard. 
77 In common law jurisdictions, for example, governmental authorities that are given rule-
making authority by legislation usually may not delegate the exercise of this power to 
other bodies unless authorized to do so by their enabling legislation.   
  
36                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 02 
 
regulators must choose a method of referencing standards that strikes an 
appropriate balance.78   
 
Standards may be referenced in a wide range of public policy instruments, 
including statutes and regulations, permits, policies and guidelines, and 
government-industry agreements.  
 
G. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
 
One reason given by Ontario Ministry of the Environment officials for 
drafting their own detailed EMS standard rather than incorporating 
Canada’s national EMS standard, ISO 14001, by reference was that 
environmental enforcement officials in the United States have done the 
same thing.  In fact, the American situation is quite different from 
Ontario’s, and the differences are instructive.   
 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance issued a guide on “compliance-
focused environmental management systems” in 1997.79  This guide, 
which was revised most recently in 2005 to reflect the publication of ISO 
14001:2004, is designed for use in federal environmental enforcement 
settlement agreements – that is, where the EPA agrees to settle a pending 
civil or criminal enforcement action in return for the alleged violator’s 
implementation of an EMS.  It describes twelve elements of a compliance-
focused EMS (CFEMS, for short), along with detailed model language for 
inclusion in a consent decree embodying the settlement agreement.   
 
                                                 
78 The Standards Council of Canada identifies three preferred methods of reference: dated 
identification of a specific issue of a standard, dated identification of a specific issue of a 
standard as amended from time to time, and undated identification.  Standards Council of 
Canada, above note 41, 7.  The latter two accommodate subsequent changes to the 
standard, but reduce the regulator’s control and may raise issues of impermissible 
delegation in some cases. 
79 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance-Focused Environmental 
Management System – Enforcement Agreement Guidance (Denver: National Enforcement 
Investigations Center, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2005) (on file with 
authors). 
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This is quite different from taking an EMS into account when calculating 
environmental penalties. First, the CFEMS guide is designed for very 
serious cases, in which formal enforcement proceedings have been 
commenced. In contrast EPs are intended for minor violations that are not 
serious enough to warrant formal legal proceedings.  In practice it appears 
that the CFEMS guide has been used rarely, only for egregious or 
persistent violations, and that target firms resent the intrusiveness and high 
level of prescriptive detail of EMS consent decrees.80   
 
Second, the CFEMS guide is intended for cases where firms are being 
required to implement an EMS as a legally mandatory requirement 
embodied in a court injunction (albeit with the defendant’s agreement), 
while in the EP situation firms are being offered a small reward for having 
already implemented an EMS voluntarily.  In effect, a CFEMS is imposed 
as a punishment for misbehaviour whereas an EP reduction is a reward for 
responsible conduct.  In the CFEMS situation, serious violators are being 
brought into line with the EPA’s vision of what an EMS should be, in a 
highly adversarial context. In the EPs situation, minor violators are being 
rewarded for having voluntarily adopted a systematic approach to 
environmental management.  The high level of scrutiny and prescriptive 
detail that might be appropriate for the former cases is not appropriate in 
the latter.   
 
Third, the US EPA’s compliance-focused EMS guide is not designed for 
use in conjunction with administrative penalties (the American equivalent 
of Ontario’s EPs).  American federal legislation and publicly available 
policies on administrative penalties are, in fact, silent on whether or how 
EMSs are taken into account in calculating APs. However, the EPA’s 
policy encouraging widespread use of EMSs81 and its long-standing policy 
of incentives for self-policing82 make it reasonable to assume that EMS 
                                                 
80 Personal communication by Wood with long-time member of U.S. national mirror 
committee on ISO 14001 (April 2007). 
81 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, United States Environmental Protection 
Agency Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems (15 Dec. 2005), 
online: http://www.epa.gov/ems/position (visited 20 Aug. 2007). 
82 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, 
Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations Final Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 
66706 (Dec. 22, 1995). 
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implementation might be given some degree of favourable consideration 
in calculating the gravity portion of APs.   
 
Finally, the CFEMS document emerged in a much more confrontational 
atmosphere than exists in Canada.  The CFEMS document was initially 
issued in 1997, around the time the US EPA effectively walked away from 
the ISO 14001 negotiating table.  The EPA had participated in the 
American mirror committee on ISO 14001 but for various reasons had 
become increasingly frustrated with the standards development process 
and the content of ISO 14001.  The CFEMS document was drafted in this 
highly charged, adversarial atmosphere.  In Canada, by contrast, 
representatives of the federal and provincial governments have 
participated actively in the national ISO 14001 mirror committee and as 
Canadian delegates to international ISO meetings.  They have participated 
in these national and international EMS standards development processes 
since the beginning in a spirit of constructive deliberation.  The 
antagonistic atmosphere in the U.S. has not been duplicated in Canada.  In 
short, the American CFEMS guide and the Ontario EPs penalty reduction 
for EMSs are aimed at very different enforcement scenarios, emerged in 
different contexts and reflect different enforcement philosophies.    
 
Efforts to incorporate EMSs into regulatory systems have not been 
restricted to the enforcement context.  Governments in several countries 
have also used EMSs as elements of voluntary environmental “leadership” 
programs, designed to reward forward-looking firms for superior 
environmental performance.  One of the best known of these programs is 
the US EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, launched in 
2000.  When the Government of Ontario decided to draft its own EMS 
requirements from scratch rather than incorporate ISO 14001 by reference, 
it may have had Performance Track in mind.  Performance Track does not 
incorporate ISO 14001 by reference but specifies its own EMS 
requirements.  The program offers favourable publicity and modest 
regulatory incentives to public and private sector organizations that 
commit publicly to achieve beyond-compliance environmental 
improvement in both regulated and non-regulated areas.  The US EPA 
made a conscious decision not to use ISO 14001 as the EMS component of 
the program. It wanted to accommodate the variety of EMSs in use in the 
US and to go beyond what ISO 14001 requires in certain respects.  What is 
significant for this article is that while Performance Track does not 
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incorporate ISO 14001 by reference, neither does it replace it with a set of 
detailed, highly prescriptive EMS requirements like the CFEMS Guide or 
Ontario’s draft EP regulations.  Instead it describes five very general EMS 
elements and recognizes that the scope and formality of an EMS will vary 
according to the organization’s size, sector, and complexity.83   
The Performance Track program has attracted around 450 participating 
organizations since its inception in 2000.84  By contrast, Ontario’s own 
answer to Performance Track, the Environmental Leaders Program, has 
attracted only five participants (four facilities and one industry 
association) since it was inaugurated in 2002.85  Unlike the Performance 
Track, the Environmental Leaders Program sets out three pages of 
requirements for participating firms’ EMSs, including fourteen specified 
elements and fairly detailed implementation requirements.86  The detail of 
the program’s EMS requirements and uncertainty about how they relate to 
established standards such as ISO 14001 are likely among the reasons for 
the low uptake of the program by industry.   
 
In short, the US experience does not support Ontario’s  decision to write 
its own detailed EMS requirements from scratch for the EP regulations.  
 
H. DON’T REINVENT THE WHEEL 
 
Nothing we have said is meant to suggest that standards eliminate the need 
for regulation or that non-governmental standards-setting bodies are a 
substitute for democratically elected governments.  All we claim is that 
there are compelling reasons for regulators, at every jurisdictional level, to 
                                                 
83 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Management System”, 
National Environmental Performance Track web site, online: 
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/program/ems.htm (visited 20 Aug. 2007). 
84 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Basic Information,” National Environmental 
Performance Track web site, online: http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/about.htm 
(visited 24 Aug. 2007). 
85Ontario Ministry of the Environment, “Environmental Leaders Program,” online: 
www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/general/leadership/index.htm. 
86 Ontario Ministry of the Environment, A Framework for Ontario’s Environmental 
Leaders Program (July 2004) (copy on file with the authors). 
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look carefully at how incorporation of voluntary standards into regulation 
might contribute to the achievement of public policy goals.  In particular, 
they should consider referring to existing, consensus-based non-
governmental standards rather than “reinventing the wheel” and drafting 
their own standards from scratch.  
 
Not only did the Ontario government choose not to incorporate ISO 14001 
by reference into its regulatory scheme, the EMS standard it devised for 
the draft regulations deviated substantially from ISO 14001.  This brings 
us to our second tip for regulators.   
 
 
Tip 2. Strive for consistency. If a widely accepted standard already 
exists on the subject, don’t create a host of unexplained 
inconsistencies between the proposed regulation and the standard. 
 
At first glance the EMS described in the draft regulations was broadly 
consistent with ISO 14001.  But even on a cursory examination, there 
were numerous significant discrepancies in terminology, concepts, scope 
and other features.  For the most part these discrepancies were 
unacknowledged and unexplained, creating ambiguity as to how, if at all, 
the requirements of ISO 14001 differed from those of the regulations.  The 
Guidance document accompanying the regulation attempted to explain 
some differences and similarities between the regulatory EMS and ISO 
14001. However, it compounded the problem by failing to identify many 
discrepancies and giving the impression that the regulations and ISO 
14001 were aligned more closely than their actual text would suggest.  
This problem, had it persisted in the final regulations, would have 
rendered largely counterproductive the province’s otherwise welcome 
effort to incorporate EMSs into its regulatory system.   
 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 
 
There is no reason to believe that the problem was intentional.  It appears 
that the government intended the regulations to be consistent with ISO 
14001 and that most of the discrepancies were inadvertent.  The difficulty, 
however, is that language is critical in international standards.  Even very 
small, seemingly inconsequential differences in text can give rise to 
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inconsistency, ambiguity and uncertainty for implementing businesses, 
conformity assessors and interested parties.  Almost every word of ISO 
14001 was the subject of intense domestic and international negotiation.  
The resulting text reflects hard-won and often delicate compromise.  What 
appear to be minor departures from accepted terminology may thus be 
perceived as major inconsistencies by EMS practitioners.           
 
Standards are the product of countless hours of negotiation. They represent 
a huge investment by governments, standards development organizations, 
business firms, and the individuals who volunteer their time to develop 
them. Single words, phrases or sentences are the subject of hundreds of 
hours of deliberations and the resulting language, while seemingly 
arbitrary, may reflect a delicate compromise achieved at great cost in time 
and energy. ISO 14001 is full of examples.  Key terms such as “prevention 
of pollution,” “continual improvement,” “control and influence,” 
“significance,” and “activities, products and services” were the subjects of 
prolonged debate in the initial development and subsequent revision of 
ISO 14001.  The language ultimately agreed upon in international 
standards often reflects very delicate compromises that would unravel if so 
much as one word were changed or one comma moved.   
 
Moreover, as a standard such as ISO 14001 spreads in the market and 
users, consultants and conformity assessment professionals gain 
experience with it, a whole set of understandings and expectations builds 
up as to its meaning. Even minor departures from the established 
terminology can inject substantial uncertainty into the market.  Fear of 
such disruption was one of the reasons that the recent revision of ISO 
14001 was restricted to clarification of the intent of the original standard 
and enhanced compatibility with the ISO 9001 quality management 
system standard.  “No new requirements” was the watchword of the 
revision.  Even if it was not carried out to the letter, 87 it reflected the 
importance attached by the international EMS standards community to 
ensuring continuity and predictability and not disturbing the delicate 
compromises embodied in the language of the standard. 
                                                 
87 For a Canadian perspective on the differences between the 1996 and 2004 editions of 
ISO 14001, see CSA Technical Committee on EMS, Guidance for Canadian Users 
on Changes Between ISO 14001:1996 and ISO 14001:2004 
(Mississauga, Ontario: CSA, 2004) (copy on file with authors). 
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In light of this history, it is useful to examine the discrepancies between 
the Ontario government’s “home-grown” EMS and ISO 14001. The home-
grown EMS was set out in Schedule 1 to the draft regulations.88   
 
B. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN ISO 14001 AND THE DRAFT EP 
REGULATION 
 
Many of the key concepts and terms in Schedule 1 were undefined, did not 
appear in ISO 14001 and were unfamiliar to EMS practitioners.  
Conversely, many of the concepts and terms found in ISO 14001, which 
represent a hard-won international consensus on EMSs, were not found in 
Schedule 1.  For example:  
 
• The Schedule 1 EMS applied to a “plant,”89 whereas an ISO EMS 
applies to an “organization”.  The two terms were defined 
differently, with the result that the physical and organizational 
scope of an ISO 14001 EMS could well have been smaller or 
larger than that of a Schedule 1 EMS. A regulated firm with an 
ISO 14001 EMS already in place could have found that its scope 
was different from that of Schedule 1.  Questions could have arisen 
whether the firm would have to redefine the scope of its EMS to 
qualify for the EP reduction (which would be unlikely to merit the 
investment), or exclude certain aspects of its EMS that fell outside 
the scope of the Schedule for purposes of determining whether it 
qualified for the EP reduction. 
• Rather than requiring an organization to identify the 
“environmental aspects” of its “activities, products and services,” 
to use the internationally recognized terminology of ISO 14001, 
the Schedule required plants to list every “process, practice, 
material, product or energy use” that may affect the natural 
environment.  While the Guidance document attempted to reassure 
readers that this was “equivalent to the process identified in ISO 
                                                 
88 Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1. 
89 Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, s. 3. 
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14001 for identifying aspects & significant aspects,”90 this was far 
from clear. It was unclear, for instance, whether “process, practice, 
material, product or energy use” includes services, which must be 
included in an ISO 14001 EMS.  The identification of 
environmental aspects and impacts and the determination of their 
significance were among the most difficult and controversial issues 
in the revision of ISO 14001.91  So much energy was expended in 
reaching an international consensus on the appropriate language 
that it is safe to say that any departure from it would have 
occasioned considerable anxiety among thousands of 
organizations, consultants and auditors that use ISO 14001.    
• Schedule 1 required plants to identify every process, practice, 
material, product or energy use that may cause an “adverse effect,” 
whereas ISO 14001 speaks of environmental “impacts.”  While 
this may seem like splitting hairs, in fact “adverse effect” is a term 
of art in Ontario environmental legislation92 which does not mean 
the same thing as ISO 14001’s “adverse impact” in all 
circumstances.   
• The emergency preparedness and response provisions of Schedule 
1 were aimed specifically at “spills,”93 whereas those in ISO 14001 
are aimed at all environmental emergencies; and 
• Schedule 1 referred to “personnel,”94 which may not have the same 
meaning as ISO 14001’s term “persons working for or on behalf of 
the organization”. This was another hotly contested phrase in the 
revision of ISO 14001 due to the interpretation by some 
stakeholders that it automatically included suppliers. 
                                                 
90 Draft EP Guidance, supra note 8, 48. 
91 This issue was so contentious during the recent revision process that its elaboration was 
confined to ISO 14001’s companion guidance standard, ISO 14004.  Developing agreed 
guidance on “aspects, impacts and significance” consumed almost three years, hundreds 
of pages of comments, and untold volunteer hours.  Johannson, who chaired the ISO task 
group on this issue, tallied more than 200 hours alone managing the international 
negotiation process.  
92 “Adverse effect” is a legislatively defined term of art with a very particular meaning in 
Ontario.  Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, ss. 1, 14. 
93 Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 10. 
94 Ibid., ss. 2, 12, 15. 
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Moving from scope and terminology to the content of EMS requirements, 
several of the requirements of Schedule 1 differed from those of ISO 
14001, usually without explanation.  In some cases the requirements of 
Schedule 1 appeared to be weaker than those of ISO 14001.  Three 
examples will suffice: 
 
• ISO 14001 seeks to promote environmentally positive 
outcomes by requiring an organization to identify significant 
environmental aspects and impacts within the scope of the 
EMS, both adverse and beneficial. Schedule 1 only required 
plants to identify those with adverse effects.95  
• Schedule 1 was limited to environmental aspects over which 
the plant has “control,”96 while ISO 14001 applies both to those 
the organization controls and those over which the organization 
determines it has an influence. ISO 14001 has the potential to 
reach farther up or down the value chain than Schedule 1.  The 
question of “control and influence” was another controversial 
drafting issue in the initial development of ISO 14001 and 
throughout its revision. The delicacy of the compromise 
reflected in the language of ISO 14001 on this issue cannot be 
overemphasized.  
• The provisions of Schedule 1 on training, awareness and 
competence97 reflected an outdated approach, borrowed from 
the first edition of ISO 14001, focused on task-specific formal 
training.  This approach was rejected explicitly in the recent 
revision of ISO 14001 and replaced with a more holistic 
approach that emphasizes competence more broadly and the 
importance of educating personnel as to why conformity with 
the EMS matters and what might happen when established 
procedures are not followed. 
 
                                                 
95 Ibid., s. 3. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., s. 12. 
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The EPs guidance document neither acknowledged these apparent 
downward departures from ISO 14001 nor offered any explanation for 
them. 
 
There were also discrepancies between Schedule 1 and ISO 14001 in 
relation to EMS audits.  Schedule 1 would have required a plant’s EMS to 
be audited against the requirements of the regulation rather than against a 
standard such as ISO 14001.  This would have blurred the line between 
EMS audits and regulatory compliance audits and led to confusion in the 
environmental auditing community. EMS auditors are trained to conduct 
EMS audits, against recognized EMS standards.  The draft regulations 
would have required a regulatory compliance audit, to be conducted 
against an EMS document that differed significantly from the EMS 
standards with which EMS auditors are familiar.  It was not clear who 
would accredit auditors to conduct these audits, what training auditors 
would need, nor whether their insurers would be willing to provide 
coverage for such audits.  It was possible that the private market would be 
unwilling or unable to supply the certifications contemplated by the 
regulations.  This issue was not addressed in the draft regulations or 
guidance.  It appears that research commissioned by the government had 
not investigated these points. 
 
Finally, the Schedule 1 EMS included requirements that went beyond the 
requirements of ISO 14001. The government explicitly acknowledged two 
of these additional requirements.  First, Schedule 1 required a policy 
commitment to “pollution prevention” (also known as “P2”), i.e., the use 
of “processes, practices, materials, products and energy that avoid or 
minimize the creation of pollutants and wastes at the source,” 98 which is 
stronger than ISO 14001’s requirement of a commitment to “prevention of 
pollution” (POP). POP is defined as including recycling and end-of-pipe 
pollution control. This was another hotly debated issue within Canada and 
in the international forum, pitting Europe against the United States, and 
developed against developing countries. Second, Schedule 1 required an 
external audit of the EMS and a certification by the external auditor that 
the regulatory EMS meets all the requirements of Schedule 1.99 As ISO 
                                                 
98 Ibid., s. 1. 
99 Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 14. 
  
46                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 02 
 
14001 is voluntary, it does not require external audits or third party 
certification.  It is up to the adopting organization to choose how to 
demonstrate its conformity to the standard.  ISO 14001 recognizes four 
options: self-declaration, second-party assessment (by a customer or other 
interested party), confirmation of self-declaration by an external party, and  
third-party certification.  We will have more to say about these options in 
the next section.100  For now we simply wish to note the inconsistency 
between Schedule 1 and ISO 14001. 
 
In addition to the two additional requirements acknowledged by the 
government, there were several it did not acknowledge: 
 
• An increased emphasis on documentation and written 
procedures.101 This was diametrically opposed to the five years 
of effort leading to the international consensus that 
documentation requirements in ISO 14001 had to be reduced to 
make EMSs more accessible to small organizations and further 
shift the focus toward results rather than paperwork. 
• A requirement to rank all environmental aspects based on the 
significance of their potential adverse effect.102 ISO 14001 
requires organizations to determine significant environmental 
aspects.  It does not require organizations to engage in an 
explicit ranking exercise.  Determination of significance relies 
heavily on judgment and informed discretion, and is affected 
by a host of variables.103  Requiring organizations to rank their 
significant aspects would add little value.  
                                                 
100 See n. 107 and accompanying text. 
101 Almost every section of Schedule 1 required the development of written procedures.  
Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, passim. 
102 Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 3. 
103 CSA published a guidance document on this topic. Canadian Standards Association, 
Plus 1145: A Guide to Identifying Significant Environmental Aspects (Rexdale, Ontario: 
CSA, 1999). 
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• The requirement that all environmental targets be 
quantifiable,104 whereas ISO 14001 recognizes that this is not 
always practicable.  
• Frequent use of words such as “every,” “all,” “any,” or “each,” 
which would result in nonconformity if even one event or item 
is missed. 
 
To recapitulate, the government’s intent was not to create an EMS 
inconsistent with ISO 14001.  But that is, in fact, what it did.  It drafted an 
entirely new EMS specification  that was full of (admittedly inadvertent) 
discrepancies in language, concepts, terminology and requirements 
compared to the leading internationally recognized EMS standard. And it 
failed to explain or acknowledge most of these discrepancies.  This could 
only be expected to lead to confusion, anxiety and resistance among 
regulated industries and environmental management professionals.   
 
We are not suggesting that governments should simply swallow non-
governmental voluntary standards lock, stock and barrel.  Far from it: 
there are many circumstances when public policy legitimately demands 
more than what voluntary standards have to offer.  This brings us to our 
third tip. 
 
 
Tip 3. Make any extra requirements clear.  If an existing widely 
accepted standard does not, on its own, meet all the public policy 
goals of the proposed regulation, identify as clearly as possible 
how the standard is deficient and what more is required to meet 
public policy objectives. 
 
As we noted in the previous section, to qualify for an EP reduction, 
regulated firms would have had to meet additional requirements in their 
EMSs beyond what is required by ISO 14001.  This is not remarkable in 
itself.  It is a government’s prerogative to ask firms to do more than just 
demonstrate conformity to a voluntary standard in return for regulatory 
benefits.  They may, for instance, want firms to put greater emphasis on 
pollution prevention (versus POP), environmental performance 
                                                 
104 Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 4. 
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improvement, public transparency or community consultation than ISO 
14001 requires. Many firms already exceed both ISO 14001’s 
requirements and governments’ expectations in these or other areas, 
because this enables them to improve their efficiency or competitiveness, 
increase productivity, satisfy customer or trade association requirements, 
improve community relations, or fulfil their own commitments to 
environmental leadership.  At the same time, incentives and performance 
vary greatly across firms and sectors, and firms’ private goals may not 
correspond with public policy goals. Governments may find existing 
voluntary standards insufficient to fulfil the public policy goals they wish 
to pursue via regulation. 
 
This brings us to the critical point. When an existing widely recognized 
standard does not, on its own, meet all the regulator’s public policy 
objectives, the regulator should specify any extra or different requirements 
clearly, so that firms, auditors, regulators and other interested parties can 
readily identify what is expected.  They should also provide a rationale for 
the extra or different requirements, so that firms, auditors, and  others can 
assess  the value of the “extra mile”.  For the most part the Ontario 
government failed to do either of these things when promulgating its draft 
EP regulations.  
 
A. ISO 14001 PLUS…WHAT? 
 
We have already laid out what we identified as the extra requirements of 
the draft regulatory EMS compared to ISO 14001.  Two of these were 
obvious and were acknowledged explicitly in the accompanying guidance 
document. These were a strengthened commitment to pollution prevention 
and a requirement for an external third-party audit and certification.  
Others were implicit, unacknowledged and uncertain in scope and effect.   
 
The only extra requirement for which the government publicly offered a 
rationale was the commitment to pollution prevention.  The guidance 
document accompanying the regulations explained the choice of pollution 
prevention rather than ISO’s broader “prevention of pollution” as follows:  
 
pollution prevention is a process that regularly and systematically 
examines root causes of all wastes generated and seeks to eliminate 
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the causes of pollution rather than treating the symptoms. Pollution 
prevention is the preferred approach at the top of the 
environmental management hierarchy, followed by re-use, 
recycling, control, treatment, disposal, with remediation and clean-
up being the least preferred option.105 
 
The government of Ontario was not alone in insisting on a commitment to 
pollution prevention in return for granting regulatory benefits to firms with 
EMSs.  Public authorities in several jurisdictions, including the 
governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States, have specified this 
as an expectation for the use of EMSs to achieve public policy goals.106   
 
The government offered no rationale, however, for the requirement of an 
external audit and certification.  ISO 14001 does not require an external 
audit or independent third-party certification of conformity.  It does not 
specify the frequency of internal audits, nor does it state that all elements 
of the EMS must be reviewed in every audit.  ISO 14001:2004 recognizes 
four conformity assessment options, designed to suit the varying needs of 
the market.  Some have a shorter audit cycle than others.  An organization 
may demonstrate conformity to ISO 14001 by: 
 
1) making a self-determination and self-declaration, or 
2) seeking confirmation of its conformance by parties having an 
interest in the organization, such as customers, or 
3) seeking confirmation of its self-declaration by a party external 
to the organization, or 
4) seeking certification/registration of its environmental 
management system by an external organization.107 
 
Option 1 is a first-party self-assessment process.  Option 2 is an 
assessment by someone having an interest in the organization, commonly 
referred to as a second-party or supplier audit.  Options 3 and 4 are 
                                                 
105 Draft EP Guidance, supra note 8, 52-53. 
106 North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Improving 
Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: 10 Elements of Effective Management 
Systems (Montreal: Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2000) 3. 
107 ISO 14001:2004, Introduction. 
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performed by independent external parties.  Option 3 was added in 2004 
largely to accommodate the EnviroReady Report process,108 in which a 
professional accountant with specific training is recognized to confirm the 
presence of the ISO 14001 elements.  This is cheaper and more 
streamlined than third-party certification.  It was created specifically to 
address the needs of SMEs by making external confirmation of ISO 14001 
implementation attractive and feasible for them.  The EnviroReady Report 
process is focused exclusively on ISO 14001; it was not designed to be 
applied to other EMSs.  Option 4 is formal third-party certification or 
registration by an accredited ISO 14001 certifier. This is typically the 
costliest of the four options.109 Most SMEs have shunned it for reasons of 
cost and culture.110    
 
The draft regulations only appeared to contemplate third-party 
certification (Option 4), despite the barriers just discussed  No rationale 
was offered publicly for this restrictive and costly approach, which would 
effectively have disqualified the vast majority of Ontario firms from 
eligibility for the EMS-based EP reduction.111  It is possible to imagine 
reasons for the government’s position. For instance, it may have believed 
that only formal third-party certification would provide adequate 
verification of firms’ EMSs.  This is a widely held but controversial view.  
Many NGOs and governments insist on third-party certification as the 
only effective guarantee of the credibility of firms’ claims about 
implementation of voluntary environmental initiatives.  This insistence 
may be well-founded in specific cases, but it may be misplaced in others.  
First, other forms of conformity assessment may provide adequate 
                                                 
108 “EnviroReady Report” is a registered trademark of _______. Information on the 
process is available at www.14000registry.com.  Johannson is the coordinating lead 
person responsible for the development of the EnviroReady Report process and has a 
commercial interest in it.  
109 See Table 2 and accompanying discussion, below. 
110 Auditors in some countries have offered clustered ISO 14001 audits, which bring the 
cost per company down by auditing several organizations at once. We are unaware of any 
examples of this in Canada. 
111 Granted, the EPs scheme is currently restricted to a small number of large industrial 
facilities for many of which formal EMS certification is not a huge financial obstacle, but 
the government plans to expand the scheme to other facilities and sectors over time.  
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credibility, depending on the circumstances.  There is a tendency to 
assume a binary choice between self-declaration and third-party 
certification, overlooking the existence of the other options mentioned 
earlier.  Second, many firms find that any credibility gains they obtain 
from third-party certification are not worth the high cost.  Third, 
accounting scandals such as Enron and Worldcom remind us that third-
party auditors themselves may not always be as objective and independent 
as we would like.  ISO 14001 has not been immune from such problems.  
Concerns have occasionally been raised about the credibility of some ISO 
14001 registrars or certificates.  The same is true of other voluntary 
certification systems. 
 
Our goal here is not to settle the debate once and for all, but to note that 
the Ontario government failed to articulate any rationale for demanding 
third party certification.  Nor did it acknowledge the associated trade-offs 
such as the higher cost to regulated firms. As a result it set a precedent that 
effectively excluded SMEs.  
 
The European EMAS regulation is an interesting contrast.  It incorporates 
ISO 14001 as its EMS specification, and specifies separately the extra 
requirements the European Commission and Parliament consider 
necessary for facilities participating in this voluntary scheme.112  We are 
not suggesting that Ontario should adopt the same requirements, only that 
it follow the example of being clear and up-front about what additional 
requirements above and beyond ISO 14001 are required to achieve public 
policy goals. 
 
While it may not have been the government’s intention to create a system 
that is inconsistent with ISO 14001, this would have been the result of the 
draft EP regulations.  The creation of a parallel, partially overlapping EMS 
specification with different scope, terminology and requirements that 
deviate from the standard could have led to a number of potential 
scenarios. First, the market might simply have ignored the regulatory 
                                                 
112 See European Commission, “EMAS – The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm (visited 24 Aug. 2007).  The main 
differences between EMAS and ISO 14001 are summarized at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/tools/faq_en.htm#difference (visited 24 Aug. 
2007). 
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EMS. The detailed EMS specification would languish in the law books, 
but no firms would attempt to implement it or claim the associated penalty 
reduction.  This would have been the most likely outcome of promulgation 
of the draft regulations, in our view. It would have been a poor return for 
the public purse indeed. Second, in the unlikely event that the market took 
the regulatory EMS seriously, the result would have been uncertainty, 
confusion and extra cost for regulated firms.  At a minimum it would have 
added substantial extra costs for regulated facilities, regulatory authorities 
and auditors, in all likelihood exceeding the rather modest 5% penalty 
reduction.113 Third, the confusion and anxiety around the regulatory EMS 
might have put some firms off EMSs and ISO 14001 altogether. This 
would have been an entirely counterproductive result.  
 
The implications of departing from an internationally accepted 
standardized approach to EMS would not necessarily be contained to the 
province of Ontario.  The draft standard drew attention and scrutiny from 
European countries, making it a potential trade issue. Ontario was thrust 
inadvertently before an international audience, which awaited the verdict 
of this particular twist on the standard with considerable interest.  
 
B. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
 
The development of Ontario’s EP regulations presented a welcome and 
long-overdue opportunity for a serious public conversation about the role 
of ISO 14001 in the pursuit of public policy goals, and the relationship 
between voluntary standardization and official regulation generally. This 
would have been a good chance to articulate what should be expected 
from regulated entities in exchange for favourable regulatory treatment.  
                                                 
113 The incremental costs of complying with the EMS component of the EP Regulations 
would likely have been substantial.  An external audit of a plant against the EMS outlined 
in Schedule 1 would include more and different criteria than an audit that tests a user’s 
conformance to ISO 14001.  There would also be an increase in costs related to the 
external audit and the possibility that professional auditors would refuse to offer auditing 
services against this EMS.  These costs would likely far outweigh the benefits of 
complying with Schedule 1, namely a 5% reduction in the gravity component of the EP.  
As a result all the work the government put into drafting the EMS component of the 
proposal would have been for naught, because no companies would have gone to the 
expense and uncertainty of implementing a Schedule 1 EMS. 
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Such a conversation should have considered, among other things, how the 
answers to these questions might vary with different regulatory contexts. 
What is appropriate in an environmental enforcement context (as in the 
case of EPs) may not, for instance, apply to voluntary environmental 
leadership programs such as the US EPA’s Performance Track or 
Ontario’s Environmental Leaders program.  What works for large 
regulated entities may not work for SMEs.  And what is appropriate for 
one regulated sector may not be appropriate for others.   
 
Such a conversation should also have considered the mounting empirical 
evidence about the effects of EMSs on environmental performance, legal 
compliance, financial results and competitiveness.114  Furthermore, it 
should have considered the inevitable trade-offs involved in any decision 
about departing from existing consensus-based non-governmental 
standards.  Extra requirements should be justified not only in terms of the 
public policy benefits they promise to achieve, but also against the 
competing benefits of uniform standards and a well-functioning national 
and international standards system.  They should also consider the 
potential negative impacts of departing from internationally accepted 
standards on business certainty and competitiveness. 
 
The government did not take this opportunity.  Instead of taking the 
objections it had received as a reason to engage in a serious discussion of 
the government’s public policy objectives and ISO 14001’s potential 
contribution to their realization, it simply rewrote the draft regulations to 
remove the detailed EMS in Schedule 1 and incorporate ISO 14001 and 
Responsible Care as the regulatory standards.  While this was probably 
welcomed by many stakeholders in industry, it was no substitute for the 
serious reflection that is needed on the role of ISO 14001 and other 
voluntary EMS standards in regulation. We hope this article spurs interest 
among relevant governments (not least Ontario’s) to devote the time and 
resources to foster this dialogue. 
 
Here is what the final Ontario regulations say about the EP reduction for 
an EMS: 
 
                                                 
114 E.g. Prakash & Potosky, above n. 7. 
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17.  The Director shall grant a reduction to the gravity 
component equal to 5 per cent of the gravity component if, at the 
time of the contravention, the regulated person had in place an 
environmental management system for the plant that was audited 
within three years before the contravention, and the audit 
confirmed one of the following: 
1. That at the time of the audit, 
i. the environmental management system was certified as 
meeting the standard set out in the document entitled 
“Environmental management systems –Requirements 
with guidance for use” and designated as CAN/CSA-
ISO 14001:04, published by the Canadian Standards 
Association, as amended from time to time, by an 
environmental management systems registrar that has 
been accredited by,  
A. the Standards Council of Canada, or 
B. an accreditation body outside of Canada that is a 
signatory to the International Accreditation Forum 
Multilateral Recognition Arrangement, and 
ii. the certification is recorded in a registry maintained by 
the registrar. 
2. That at the time of the audit, the environmental 
management system was determined to be compliant with 
the standard set out in the document referred to in 
paragraph 1 by a person who,  
i. is not an employee at the plant or a contractor who 
routinely works at the plant, 
ii. audits according to a code of practice that conforms 
with the document entitled “Guidelines for quality 
and/or environmental management systems auditing” 
and designated as CSA/ISO 19011:2003, published by 
the Canadian Standards Association, as amended from 
time to time, and 
iii. is certified by, 
A. an auditing certification body that has been 
accredited by the Standards Council of Canada, 
including the Canadian Environmental Certification 
Approvals Board, or 
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B. a body outside of Canada that is a signatory to the 
International Accreditation Forum Multilateral 
Recognition Arrangement. 
3. That at the time of the audit, the environmental 
management system was verified as meeting the 
requirements [of the Responsible Care Program] published 
by the Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association, as 
amended from time to time, by a person authorized by the 
Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association to audit 
environmental management systems.115   
 
Although the language is convoluted, its effect is simple. To qualify for an 
EP reduction, a plant must have an EMS that is: 
 
1) certified to ISO 14001 by an accredited ISO 14001 registrar,  
2) audited by an independent external auditor who determines it to 
conform to ISO 14001, or  
3) verified by an authorized Responsible Care verifier to meet the 
requirements of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
program. 
 
Gone is the detailed, home-grown EMS specification with all the 
discrepancies and ambiguities that differentiated it from ISO 14001.  Gone 
is the requirement to audit the EMS against the regulation, which would 
have blurred the distinction between a regulatory compliance audit and an 
EMS audit.  That much is to be congratulated.   
 
But the government’s wholesale retreat from almost all elements of the 
draft EMS specification left several questions unanswered.  Why did it 
abandon the requirement for a commitment to pollution prevention?  
Presumably it had given this issue serious thought and had cogent reasons 
for this departure from ISO 14001. The same might be asked of the other 
“ISO 14001-extras” that were dropped from the final version, including 
the emphasis on written procedures, the requirement to rank-order all 
significant environmental aspects, and the requirement to quantify all 
environmental targets.   
                                                 
115 O. Reg. 222/07, s. 17. 
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On the other hand, why did it retain the requirement for an external audit 
or ISO 14001 registration? The final regulations went some way toward 
meeting the objections discussed earlier, but stopped short of 
accommodating conformity assessment options that are accessible to the 
vast majority of SMEs. While the regulations were geared to large, point-
source polluters, they set a precedent that will do nothing to help SMEs. 
In short, instead of specifying more carefully how its vision of an 
acceptable EMS for purposes of the EP regulations differed from the 
requirements of ISO 14001, at the eleventh hour the government simply 
abandoned most of the additional requirements it had initially proposed, 
passing up an opportunity for a much-needed conversation about the role 
of voluntary EMS standards in regulation.   
 
Perhaps some of this difficulty could have been avoided had the 
government taken different steps in the run-up to this regulatory initiative.  
This brings us to our fourth tip. 
 
 
Tip 4. Connect with the experts. Consult relevant standards 
development committees when developing regulations 
 
The Ministry of the Environment engaged in a year-long public 
consultation process on EPs between September 2005 and September 
2006.116  According to the government, the consultation process had five 
phases.  Phase 1 consisted of private “pre-consultations” with key industry 
and non-industry stakeholders.  Phase 2 featured broad-based 
consultations across the province and ended with identification of key 
issues for future work.  Phase 3 involved the distillation and reporting of 
stakeholder input and establishment of a MOE-stakeholder working group 
to hold focused discussions on the key issues identified in Phase 2.  The 
working group was selected based on input from industry associations, 
                                                 
116 Ontario Ministry of the Environment, above n. 25.  In addition, the government 
commissioned research into the status of EMS adoption in Ontario and various market 
participants’ views of EMS standards.  The researcher must have consulted a very limited 
range of sources, because the research does not appear to have turned up most of the 
information and concerns identified in this article, which were well known in the EMS 
standards community. 
2008] HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS 57 
 
 
 
community-based organizations and ENGOs that had been involved in the 
earlier consultations.  While in theory all stakeholder groups were to be 
represented equally, the majority of members came from large regulated 
industries.117 In Phase 4, the MOE-stakeholder working group worked 
intensively over several months to explore issues, review best practices 
and make detailed comments and recommendations.  Finally, in Phase 5, 
the government reviewed and analyzed the working group’s comments 
and recommendations. It then prepared the draft regulations for posting on 
the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR) registry.   
 
At no point in this process did the government notify or consult the 
relevant organs of the National Standards System – in particular, the 
CSA’s multi-stakeholder committee responsible for development and 
maintenance of national environmental management systems standards.  
No formal channels of communication were opened between the 
government and the committee until after the draft regulations were 
released for public comment, when Ministry officials accepted the 
committee’s invitation to meet and discuss the EMS component of the 
regulations.   
 
This was probably an inadvertent oversight, the product of a lack of 
awareness in the relevant government agencies of the existence and role of 
the National Standards System and the EMS committee.  But the oversight 
was serious since it deprived the government of what was undoubtedly the 
country’s largest collective reservoir of expertise on EMS standards 
development.  It was also inconsistent with one of the fundamental 
principles of the Canadian standards system, a principle shared with most 
other jurisdictions: that there should be ongoing cooperation and 
communication between standards development bodies and public 
authorities, especially in subject areas on which regulation and 
standardization overlap.  As the Standards Council of Canada recently 
stated: 
 
                                                 
117 The working group had eight members representing large industrial polluters, four 
ENGO members, one local community group representative, one member representing 
health units and one MOE official who acted as chair.  Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment, above n. 25   
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The effective development of a standard suitable for incorporation 
by reference in a legislative instrument requires that a cooperative 
effort between the regulatory authority and the standards 
development committee be established from the outset.118 
 
To reap the many benefits of consensus-based non-governmental 
standards development activities and avoid the many potential pitfalls 
described in this article, governments need to ensure that their key policy 
development and legislative drafting personnel are aware of relevant 
standards development committees. They need to consult with those 
committees when developing regulations on subjects on which standards 
exist.  This should be a routine part of public policy development. 
 
Ad hoc, project-specific consultation is only one way of engaging with and 
reaping the benefits of the voluntary standards development process.  
Another is to participate actively in the work of standards development 
committees. 
 
 
Tip 5. Get involved in voluntary standards development. Participate in 
the work of relevant standards development committees to keep 
abreast of relevant issues and influence the content of standards on 
an ongoing basis.  
 
The Standards Council of Canada puts it simply: 
 
Representatives of interested regulatory authorities should be 
active participants on the standards development committee. If for 
reasons of balance, time, or distance this is not possible, they 
should be associate or corresponding members who can make 
comments and provide input. 
 
For several years the Ontario Ministry of the Environment had an active 
participant on the national EMS standards committee, but this 
participation lapsed around 2000. Periodic entreaties by the committee to 
renew the Ministry’s participation were not acted upon.  Other government 
                                                 
118 Standards Council of Canada, supra note 41, 4. 
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officials have also sat on the committee, including representatives of the 
federal government, other provinces and municipalities.  Because of the 
“balanced matrix” rules for the composition of standards committees,119 it 
would not be possible to accommodate representatives of all potentially 
interested government bodies. This does not necessarily prevent them 
from participating as observers, receiving committee correspondence, or 
obtaining periodic updates.   
 
Participating in the work of standards development committees offers 
numerous potential advantages to government officials. These include 
keeping abreast of the latest developments and innovations in the 
marketplace, and influencing the content of standards in directions 
consistent with public policy goals.  One of the biggest obstacles to 
government participation in standards development bodies is limited 
resources. This was due mainly to the massive budget and staff cuts that 
were experienced in the neo-conservative atmosphere of the 1990s in 
many countries.  These cuts were especially severe in environmental 
ministries.  In these circumstances many government officials were simply 
spread too thin to take advantage of participation in standards committees.  
Nonetheless, some of the deepest cuts have been restored and many 
government agencies are recovering from their direst straits.   
 
If the concept of smart regulation is to be taken seriously, with its 
emphasis on harnessing non-governmental resources and fostering the 
reflexive, self-regulatory capacities of regulated communities in the 
service of public goals, governments need to put a higher strategic and 
operational priority on participation in the work of voluntary standards 
development.   
 
 
Tip 6. Consider the needs of small business. Design regulations in a 
way that addresses the special characteristics and challenges of the 
SMEs that represent around 98% of the business community.  
 
With this we come to the last of our tips and what is perhaps the toughest 
challenge of smart regulation: to design regulation in a way that 
                                                 
119 See above, n. 57-60 and accompanying discussion. 
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effectively enlists small business in the quest for sustainable development.  
Both governments and standardization bodies have failed to engage small 
business. For small business this is a double-edged sword. They need the 
help, but they don’t necessarily want the attention. Yet, to resolve the most 
pressing environmental problems of the contemporary period and 
accelerate the transformation toward a sustainable society, it will be 
necessary to engage and mobilize small business.   
 
Neither the draft nor the final environmental penalties regulations make 
any effort to address small business. As mentioned, the Ontario EPs 
scheme only applies to large facilities in nine industry sectors that 
discharge contaminated effluent to a surface water course or private 
effluent treatment plant.  We are not suggesting that the solution is to 
extend the EPs regime to all regulated facilities in the province, big and 
small.  But the solution must involve more than simply ignoring small 
business.  We admit that this might sound like the pot calling the kettle 
black, because the environmental standardization community has also 
failed to respond to the needs and challenges of small business. One could 
say that they have failed to understand the needs of their customer (a mark 
against them from a quality management perspective), but they do it 
consistently. 
 
A. THE SLEEPING GIANT OF THE SUSTAINABILITY STORY 
 
Small business is the sleeping giant of the sustainability story.  It has been 
largely ignored by environmental regulation. On the one hand, small 
businesses should be happy about this, since regulatory compliance tends 
to be considerably more expensive for small than large businesses on a per 
capita basis.120 Yet, the majority of Canadian small businesses believe in 
sustainability.121 This giant is starting to stir and is likely to come fully 
awake soon.  And when it does awaken – no matter in which direction it 
                                                 
120 Laura Jones, et al., Rated R: Prosperity Restricted by Red Tape (Toronto: Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business, 2005), online: 
www.cfib.ca/research/reports/RatedR.pdf. 
121 Matthew Armstrong et al., Achieving Eco-Prosperity: SMEs’ Perspectives on the 
Environment (Toronto: CFIB, 2007), online: www.cfib.ca/research/reports/rr3039.pdf. 
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moves – it is likely to have an influence on environment and society that 
belies its low profile.  In Canada, small businesses rarely grab media 
headlines. They may not be much in the public eye, but they are well 
connected to the community.  They may not have global brands to protect, 
but their customers trust them more than they do national or multinational 
chains. Small businesses cannot afford to engage in massive publicity 
exercises, but they have their networks.  They typically do not engage in 
large scale political lobbying. While associations exist to lobby on behalf 
of small business, 122 in most countries these are dwarfed by the number 
and resources of big business lobbyists. SMEs have been largely ignored 
as the silent majority, and that is a serious error for both regulators and 
standards developers. SMEs are incredibly numerous, widely dispersed 
throughout society, and very closely integrated into the local fabric of the 
communities in which they operate. We ignore them at our peril.  
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) make up the vast majority of 
business organizations in the world. In many developing countries they 
dominate the local economy.  Even in advanced industrialized countries 
where large business firms appear prevalent, SMEs represent an 
overwhelming majority of business organizations and account for a 
substantial portion of economic activity.  They employ a great number of 
Canadians. SMEs make up between 95% and 98% of Canadian businesses 
(or 1.04 million of Canada’s approximately 1.07 million legally 
constituted employer businesses),123 and contribute between 45% and 60% 
of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product.124 Canada has a very large micro-
enterprise base – i.e, legally constituted employer enterprises with fewer 
than five people.  In addition, there are another 1.2 million business 
entities in Canada without full-time payroll. These may be cottage 
industries, seasonal ventures or simply one-person outfits, augmenting 
their human resource needs with part-time or contract help.  Small 
business represents the foundation of a national economy, and its viability 
has profound impacts on the health and prosperity of the national 
                                                 
122 In Canada, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business is the principal voice for 
small business, online: www.cfib.ca. 
123 Industry Canada, above n. 14. 
124 The range varies from source to source and depends partly on the definition of small 
business used. 
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economy. Without small business, no economy can evolve to become 
sustainable. 
 
The vast majority of environmental regulation in Canada and many other 
countries is simply not designed for or applied on a substantial scale to 
small business.  And when it is applied to small business, small business 
bears a disproportionate share of the cost of compliance.  Research 
conducted by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) 
indicates that regulation imposes a higher financial burden on small 
business than their larger counterparts (see Table 1). This results in an 
uneven playing field and unequal costs as a fraction of annual turnover.   
 
Number 
of 
employees 
Annual 
compliance 
costs per 
employee 
Low  
range 
Upper 
range 
Estimated Annual  
Turnover 
Compliance 
cost as % of 
Annual  
Turnover 
1-4 $5,317 $5,317 $21,260 $250,000 to  
$1,000,000 
2.13%  
 
5-19 $2,844 $14,222 $54,036 NA  
20-49 $1,922     $38,444 $94,178 Under  
$5,000,000 
.77% to  
1.88% 
50-99 $1,422 $71,100 $140,778 NA  
100 + $1,104 $110,400 $5,164,512 $19,331,009,000 .27%  
 
Table 1.  Comparative Financial Burden of Regulation on Canadian Businesses 
Source: Extrapolated from data contained in Laura Jones et al., Rated R: Prosperity 
Restricted by Red Tape (Toronto: CFIB, 2005). 
 
Conventional environmental regulation typically disregards the 
organizational and cultural characteristics of small business.  The vast 
majority of small businesses do not have formalized management systems, 
but operate informally with heavy reliance on personal knowledge, 
memory and informal interpersonal networks based on trust.  Multi-
tasking is pervasive, with one or a few individuals performing roles that 
would be divided among multiple people or divisions in large firms.  
Initiative, adaptability and self-reliance are at a premium in this 
atmosphere.  A very high value is placed on autonomy and independence. 
Governments and laws tend to be viewed with a high level of skepticism.  
Government officials and regulations are typically resented as unwelcome 
intrusions at worst, or ignored as irrelevant at best.   
 
2008] HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS 63 
 
 
 
Small businesses are not against environmental protection. They are 
typically supportive of good environmental laws; it’s just that many 
haven’t seen a good example. Small business owners are less likely than 
large firms to establish constructive, ongoing, long-term relationships with 
environmental licensing and inspection officials.  They are far less likely 
to engage in lobbying of policy makers than are large firms. They operate 
on ultra slim margins.  The profit motive often plays a smaller role in 
SMEs than in larger enterprises.  Many SMEs exist simply to procure a 
modest living for their principals. Others exist because their principals had 
no other choice than to strike out on their own, having been made 
redundant by downsizing or closure of larger private or public sector 
entities. 
 
Command regulation, with its emphasis on prohibition, detailed technical 
prescriptions and quasi-criminal enforcement, is ill-suited to the 
informality of small business. It tends to aggravate the antagonism toward 
government latent in many small business owners, leading to greater 
resistance rather than voluntary compliance.  
 
While there have been increases in recent years in transparency and public 
participation in environmental law, law-making processes remain largely 
inaccessible to SMEs and ordinary citizens.  This is even truer of 
regulations than statutes.  While statutes must be debated, passed and 
amended publicly by elected representatives in legislatures, regulations 
and other subsidiary legislative instruments are developed, approved and 
amended by the executive branch of government.  In Canada and other 
jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of government, the party holding 
the most seats in the legislature controls the executive. This has led to a 
tendency to enact very vague, general and discretionary environmental 
statutes that leave most of the details to be worked out via regulations and 
administrative decision-making.  This has often been accompanied by a 
tendency to work out the content of environmental regulation through 
closed-door negotiations between governments and major industrial 
polluters.125   
                                                 
125 E.g. Michael Howlett, "Policy Instruments and Implementation Styles: The Evolution 
of Instrument Choice in Canadian Environmental Policy" in Debora VanNijnatten and 
Robert Boardman, eds., Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 25. 
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Governments have made increasing use of public notice and comment 
procedures in recent years, but this is still not as common or robust as one 
might hope. More frequently, the key discussions still occur in closed door 
consultations with industry and a small range of other organized 
stakeholders. These consultations are confined to those stakeholders who 
understand where and when to intervene and have the necessary resources 
to do so.  Small business by and large has neither the time nor the 
resources to engage in these processes.  As a result, regulations are 
unlikely to overcome these hurdles unless an easier access process is 
developed. Even if design challenges are overcome, at the end of the day 
their application by regulators knowledgeable about how small business 
operates must be addressed. Only when both these aspects are addressed 
will Canada’s regulatory scheme be sensitive to the needs and resource 
constraints of small business.  
 
B. THE SMALL BUSINESS SUCCESSION CRISIS 
 
These problems with environmental regulation do not exist in a static 
historical setting.  Demographic trends in Canada have conspired to create 
an impending crisis in the small business community and an 
unprecedented opportunity to help this sector embrace sustainable 
business practices.  The Canadian small business community is aging.  
Sixty-six percent of Canada’s small business owners intend to retire over 
the next ten years.126 This translates into approximately 680,000 
companies. Given the sheer number of companies involved in this 
transition, this represents a huge socio-economic upheaval. Approximately 
37% of Canadian small business owners want to sell their businesses on 
the open market and another 26% want to sell or transfer their businesses 
within the family in the near future. 4% intend to wind down their 
business.  A further 26% have not figured out any kind of exit vision.  The 
remaining 7% responded “other”, which may or may not indicate that they 
                                                 
126 Doug Bruce, “The Context: Turning Risks into Opportunities” in Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, Succession Planning Toolkit for Business Owners (Toronto: 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2006). 
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have planned their succession.127 Between these last two categories, this 
means that over the next ten years up to 178,000 Canadian small 
businesses are uncertain about what to do 
 
We are entering a protracted buyer’s market. It will continue for a period 
of ten to eighteen years. In the present era, when environmental protection 
is a top of mind public issue, evidence of a well managed company will 
include environmental management and quite possibly environmental 
performance front and centre on a buyer’s checklist.  
 
The presence of a robust and credible environmental management system 
(EMS) could become a screening tool for a prospective buyer or even a 
deciding factor when other factors are equal. So why are small businesses 
not racing to adopt ISO 14001?  Let us take a bird’s eye view of the 
situation.128 
 
C. SMALL BUSINESS AND ISO 14001 
 
First, most small business owners have not even heard of the standard.129 
Of those who have heard, the standard is marketed to them as something 
to be adopted for third-party certification. Certification, however, is a large 
                                                 
127 Doug Bruce and Derek Picard, Succession Can Breed Success; SME Succession and 
Canada’s Economic Prosperity (Toronto: CFIB, 2005), online: 
www.cfib.ca/research/reports/rr3007.pdf.  
128 While this situation is discussed in the context of Canada, the challenge of succession 
is not exclusive to that country, nor is the failure of ISO to understand the nature and 
culture of its potential customer, small business. According to the International Finance 
Corporation, there are approximately 143 million small businesses in the world. 
International Finance Corporation, above n. 65. The issue of succession may not be 
pertinent to some transition economies or developing countries. Other related drivers, like 
the trade impact of large-scale adoption of ISO 14001 or supply chain pressures, may pull 
small business in these countries toward the standard.  
129 The Canadian Federation of Independent Business has surveyed its members’ 
awareness of ISO 14001 a number of times. Johansson’s firm, E2M, has conducted 
periodic surveys on EMS and SMEs since 1994. The results are consistent.  The vast 
majority of small business owners, like the general public, has either not heard about ISO 
14001, or doesn’t recall it.   
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expense for small business as a fraction of annual turnover (see Table 2). 
The price tag alone tends to shut the door on their interest.  
 
Organization 
size/sales 
Initial 
document 
review 
Follow-up 
reviews 
Number of 
employees 
Total cost per 
employee 
Minimum 
total cost as 
percentage 
of sales 
Small: 
$500,000 
$6,000 $2,500 1-59 $174-$8,500 1.70% 
Medium: 
$5,000,000 
$10,000 $5,000 50-100 $150 - $300 0.30% 
Large: 
$50,000,000 
$18,000 $7.000 101+ $0.21 -$248. 0.05% 
 
Table 2.  Estimated Cost of Registration to ISO 9001 or ISO 14001, 1998. 
Source: The table is based on research conducted by Johannson’s firm E2M in 1998. 
Reproduced with permission.   
 
Moreover, as we discussed earlier, certification is only one of four equally 
acceptable options for demonstrating conformity to ISO 14001.130  The 
EMS community needs to do a better job of communicating the message 
that organizations may choose which of the four options best suits their 
needs.  In any case, for those that get past the certification price tag, the 
next barrier to overcome relates to the typical differences between small 
and large businesses’ culture and manner of operation. As it is currently 
marketed by consultants, auditors, standards bodies and ISO itself, ISO 
14001 is a formal management system designed by large entities based on 
their own experience. By contrast, 95% of small businesses operate 
informally. They are unlikely to embrace a formal environmental 
management system unless there are some unequivocal signs from 
business and government that they want small business, as suppliers and 
taxpayers, to get on board. From a small business perspective this might 
mean that the supply chain demonstrates a willingness to include the cost 
of EMS implementation and maintenance in the price of products and 
services, or that governments demonstrate a willingness to subsidize all or 
part of such costs, so that small businesses are not left bearing the entire 
burden themselves.   
 
                                                 
130 See discussion above, n. 107 and accompanying text. 
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It takes time to implement an EMS. Time is a non-renewable resource for 
an SME. One person spending one hour a week on an EMS can represent 
3% of a very small business’s available labour,131 a substantial portion for 
firms that typically operate on very small profit margins. Implementing an 
EMS also takes money. If done wisely, this can be money well spent, even 
for small businesses.. On a limited budget, it is wiser for the business 
owner to invest in identifying environmental aspects (that is, discovering 
what the company has or does that adds to its environmental footprint and 
detracts from the bottom line) than an “end-of-pipe” environmental 
performance audit. Some auditors provide good value in a gap analysis, 
which can help the small business owner understand what the company 
already does well, and where the gaps are. This can be money well spent. 
 
Secondly, ISO and national standards bodies have not found a way to 
ensure effective participation by small business in environmental 
standards development.  Small business participation has been a perennial 
issue in TC 207, the ISO technical committee responsible for 
environmental management systems.  Participation by small business in 
TC 207 has been woefully inadequate from the start, and many national 
mirror committees have fared no better.  TC 207 has, for example, had a 
series of internal task forces in recent years aimed at identifying and 
overcoming obstacles to SME participation in TC 207 and the 
development and revision of ISO 14001. Yet these task forces have had 
almost no SME representation.  It has been left largely to self-selected 
delegates from government, big business, certification bodies or 
management consultancies to “represent” the perspectives of small 
business in these processes.   
 
The same resource, knowledge and time constraints that prevent small 
business from participating effectively in national law-making activities 
operate in the world of standards development.  Numerous presentations 
have been made at ISO meetings on the challenges faced by SMEs, but 
ISO committees and central organs seem unable or unwilling to do 
anything about them.  And despite the widely acknowledged SME deficit 
in TC 207, the few member-driven small business associations that have 
actually attempted to participate, such as NORMAPME (the European 
                                                 
131 Assuming a micro-enterprise consisting of one person working 35 hours per week. 
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Office of Crafts, Trades and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises for 
Standardization), have often felt ignored, alienated and frustrated.    
Just as government regulators should take smart regulation seriously, 
standards development bodies should develop a better understanding of 
the nature and culture of small business. They should develop a “smart” 
approach to standards development and the marketing of standards to 
small business.  This will entail developing ways to market the key 
elements of ISO 14001 to small business that will bring them the greatest 
value and help them shift their businesses towards sustainability now.  Just 
as full compliance with all (theoretically) applicable laws is typically not 
an entry level activity for small business, full EMS adoption based on the 
degree of formality found in larger entities may not be the best approach 
for SMEs. Management experts who understand the culture of small 
enterprises agree that some increases in the degree of formality of a 
business can result increased productivity.132 The optimal degree of 
formality is the great unknown.  What is clear, however, is that many 
standards developers, consultants and auditors who market ISO 14001 
presume a degree of formality far beyond what is suitable or realistic for 
the vast majority of SMEs. The approach TC 207 has taken to this issue is 
to initiate work on ISO 14005, a guidance standard for “phased 
implementation” of ISO 14001.133  This guide is unlikely to present a 
sustainable solution, however, because it fails to acknowledge some basic 
facts about small business, including the relative informality of SMEs’ 
management systems.  Instead it assumes that SMEs can ingest an 
excessively formal management system simply by breaking it into pieces 
to be swallowed sequentially.  In fact, experience with “staged 
implementation” of EMS standards in Europe suggests that many SMEs 
will not complete all stages, or will regress when government subsidies for 
EMS implementation dry up. A phased implementation approach thus 
risks diluting the credibility of ISO 14001, if organizations stop part way 
through the process yet still attempt to claim the reputational benefits of 
                                                 
132 Personal communications between Johannson and representatives of the Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business, NORMAPME (the European Office of Crafts, 
Trades and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises for Standardization), and the US 
National Federation of Independent Business (various dates). 
133 ISO/CD 14005, Environmental management system — Guide for the phased 
implementation of an environmental management system — Including the use of 
environmental performance evaluation (Committee Draft of 2 February 2007). 
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ISO 14001 adoption. Furthermore, ISO 14005 is an unwieldy and complex 
document, weighing in at 81 pages in its current draft.  It is far too long to 
be of any use to small businesses except as a doorstop.  If ISO 14005 is 
published without substantial changes, it will be an embarrassment to ISO 
at best, or drive an irrevocable wedge between ISO and small business at 
worst.  
 
ISO 14005 illustrates a weakness of ISO’s system for bringing forward 
new standards for development. All ISO standards, and management 
system standards in particular, are supposed to be developed based on a 
solid understanding of market need.  This should involve, at a minimum, a 
demonstration of significant global demand for the proposed standard 
among potential users of the standard.134 The “phased implementation” 
standard reached ISO via a circuitous route, originally having been 
proposed at the European level.135 No proper market justification research 
was presented before ISO decided to start work on it.  The research that 
was proffered related to Europe, and had serious weaknesses in scope and 
methodology.  To critics of the phased implementation standard, including 
the Canadian EMS mirror committee, the real motivation for the 
development of an ISO guide on phased implementation appeared to be to 
broaden the revenue base for certain standards development bodies that 
had a commercial interest in the phased implementation model.  One of 
the main proponents of the phased implementation guide was the British 
                                                 
134 ISO rules require a market justification study before any new management system 
standard may be developed.  ISO Guide 72, Guidelines for the Justification and 
Development of Management System Standards (Geneva: ISO, 2001).  Guide 72, on its 
face, applies to all management system standards, from guidance documents to 
specification standards.  When ISO 14005 was proposed, however, ISO took the position 
that Guide 72 only applies to specification standards.  Since ISO 14005 was only 
intended as a guide, the market justification requirement did not apply. 
135 Development of a phased EMS implementation standard was initially proposed, and 
accepted, within CEN (Comité Européen de Normalisation), the principal European 
standards development body.  The proposed guide would have covered staged 
implementation of EMAS and ISO 14001.  Before work could begin at the European 
level, CEN proposed to transfer the work item to ISO under the Vienna Agreement, an 
agreement between the two organizations on technical cooperation in areas of mutual 
interest.  The proposal was balloted to ISO/TC 207 members, and approved by a vote of 
24-7, with 5 abstentions.  A new subcommittee was created within TC 207, and work 
began on the phased implementation guide in 2006. 
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Standards Institution (BSI).  BSI had already published a British standard 
on staged implementation, BS 8555.136  BSI earns revenues both from the 
sale of BS 8555 and from provision of consulting services for phased EMS 
implementation.  BS 8555 was one of the main seed documents for the 
proposed European standard on staged implementation, and the only one 
forwarded to ISO/TC 207 members when the proposal was elevated to 
ISO.  Whatever other motivations BSI might have had, incorporation of its 
phased implementation model in an ISO standard would expand the 
market for its consulting services and enhance the global reach of the BSI 
brand.   
 
In short, there is reason to believe that ISO 14005 is being driven by 
parochial economic interests rather than demonstrated global market 
demand.  Many observers and participants doubt that ISO 14005 should be 
allowed to continue to drain the resources of the standards development 
community. Even if it is finalized in ISO, it is not clear that it will have 
any traction in North America. 137 It just does not appear to meet the needs 
of North American small businesses.  
 
In short, both governments and standards development bodies have failed 
to respond adequately to the characteristics and challenges of small 
business. EMS standards and EP regulations are only small manifestations 
of this larger problem.  In the concluding section of this article, we 
speculate about where this leaves us on the path toward smart regulation 
and sustainable development. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
The experience with the incorporation of environmental management 
systems into Ontario’s environmental penalties regulations suggests six 
                                                 
136 BS 8555:2003, Environmental management systems — Guide to the phased 
implementation of an environmental management system including the use of 
environmental performance evaluation (London: British Standards Institution, 2003). 
137 Both Canada and the US voted against the development of the standard in ISO.  
Canada decided from the start not to participate actively in the development of the 
standard, and the US walked away from the development process in the summer of 2007.  
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lessons about the incorporation of voluntary standards into official 
regulation.  First, if a standard exists that fulfills the objectives of a 
proposed regulation, and the standard was developed by a recognized 
standards body through a relatively robust multi-stakeholder consensus 
process, regulators should incorporate the standard into the regulatory 
scheme rather than re-inventing the wheel.  Second, they should do so in a 
way that avoids a proliferation of unexplained discrepancies between the 
proposed regulation and the standard. Third, if an existing widely accepted 
standard does not, on its own, meet all the public policy goals of the 
proposed regulation, regulators should make it clear how the standard is 
deficient and what more is required to meet public policy objectives.  
Fourth, they should consult relevant standards development committees 
when developing regulations.  Fifth, they should, to the extent possible, 
participate in the work of relevant standards development committees to 
keep abreast of relevant issues and to influence the content of standards on 
an ongoing basis.  Finally, both regulators and standards development 
bodies should address the special characteristics and challenges of the 
small, medium and micro-enterprises that make up more than 95 percent 
of the business community. 
 
The first five suggestions have the potential to advance smart regulation in 
modest but significant ways by – among other things – saving government 
policy development costs, enlisting non-governmental expertise, 
enhancing uniformity of business requirements, taking advantage of 
market forces, and enhancing the reflexive capacities of regulated entities.  
Our sixth suggestion, however, has truly transformative potential and 
represents a fundamental challenge for both regulators and standardization 
bodies.  Designing and implementing regulatory systems that effectively 
mobilize small business will be critical to sustainable development.  While 
debate continues to rage on the meaning of sustainability and sustainable 
development, there is little doubt that they represent the single largest 
challenge now faced by humankind. The recent media frenzy related to 
one issue, climate change, has led to heightened public awareness and 
concern. This has pressured politicians to put the environment high on the 
policy agenda, although even with the increased political rhetoric about 
climate change and the broader issue of sustainability, little if any progress 
has been made.  
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It is beyond the scope of an article on the incorporation of EMS standards 
into a provincial environmental penalties scheme to speculate further on 
what a sustainable economy might look like, or how smart regulation, 
small business and sustainability relate to each other.  What we can say is 
that there is a sense of urgency, driven largely by those who have studied 
the projections of climate change. This includes scientists, politicians and 
economists who are ringing warning bells about the dire consequences of 
radical shifts in our climate.  This urgency will soon be intensified by a 
growing number of small business owners wanting to retire. This 
succession crisis will not be contained to the Canadian small business 
community. Policy makers and shapers around the world, and at all levels 
of government, need to understand the confluence of these issues, and how 
pervasive the impacts will be.  
 
It is possible to transform this demographic bust into an environmental 
boon, but we have a very small window of opportunity to respond to the 
challenge.  Whether it is climate change, small business succession or 
sustainable development generally, the window for effective action will 
close in the next few years. The next two to three years are probably the 
most critical, putting the challenge well within the planning horizons of 
today’s politicians and investors.  This should be some reason to hope that 
action will be taken, but the magnitude of the challenges should not be 
underestimated.  
